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SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
EFFICIENT PROCESS OR "CHILLING
EFFECTS"? TAKEDOWN NOTICES UNDER
SECTION 512 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quiltert
I. INTRODUCTION
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
(OCILLA), codified at 17 USCA § 512,' was passed in 1998 as a
compromise between the nation's copyright and online service
provider (OSP) 2 industries. 3 The legislation, passed as Title II of the
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1. OCILLA is codified as Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (2000).
2. We generally use the term "OSP" to reflect any online service provider covered by
§ 512, modifying it with the appropriate section. This helps to avoid confusion with the term
"ISP" which is often, but not always, used more narrowly to describe § 512(a) (Internet access)
providers.
3. Senator Hatch lauded the private sector for their compromises which made the
unanimous passage of the bill in the Senate possible. See 144 CONG. REC. S12375-02, S12376.
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act,4 created a process that was
intended to help copyright owners ensure rapid removal of allegedly
infringing material from the Internet while guaranteeing compliant
OSPs a safe harbor from liability for Internet users' acts of copyright
infringement. The U.S. copyright industry thus gained a new tool to
combat the loss of billions of dollars (U.S.) annually from copyright
infringement; 5 OSPs, concerned about the direction of court decisions
concerning their liability for their users' copyright infringement,
received protection from potential secondary liability. To qualify,
OSPs must "accommodate" technical protection measures employed
by copyright holders and implement policies for terminating the
accounts of repeat infringers. 6 Further measures are also required of
OSPs in some situations, including the takedown of online material in
response to a copyright-holder notice-the subject of this Article.
In negotiating the § 512 compromise, copyright holders sought
to ensure that OSPs had incentives to remove infringing material, and
OSPs sought to avoid lawsuits and judgments based on secondary
liability for users' acts of copyright infringement. 7 The resulting
§ 512 safe harbor is granted to OSPs in exchange for the
"expeditious" takedown, upon notice by the copyright holder, of
allegedly infringing material. The alleged infringers are to be
protected from mistaken takedowns and misuse of this rather
Industry representatives were able to negotiate the bill amongst themselves from January to
April 1998. S. REP. NO. 105-109 (1998).
4. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281/S.2037, incorporated originally
separate proposals for on-line limitation of liability, Senator Ashcroft's S. 1146 and
Congressman Coble's H.R. 3209 (introduced the year before as H.R. 2180), with four other
titles whose original impetus was updating United States copyright law to match provisions of
the WIPO treaty. The WIPO treaty had not included any special provisions concerning the
liability of OSPs. S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998).
5. According to the industry association numbers, which we recognize are not
uncontroversial: During the debates on the DMCA, Sen. Kohl cited $15 billion in losses, also
based on entertainment industry numbers. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT:
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET (2000). The RIAA estimates $4.2
billion/year worldwide. See http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2006). The
MPAA estimates $3 billion/year worldwide. See http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/ (last visited
Apr. 22, 2006). The Business Software Association (BSA) estimates losses to the software
industry of $31 billion/year worldwide. See 2005 Global Study,
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005-Global-Study-English.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2006).
6. The definition of "repeat infringer" continues to be debated. Some copyright holders
press OSPs to terminate users who are the subject of multiple notices. (Confidential Interview
with ISP representative.) However, case law has not yet established the parameters of this
requirement. A number of courts have discussed termination on receipt of multiple notices as
demonstrating effective implementation of a repeat infringer policy. See infra note 19.
7. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2004).
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remarkable extra-judicial process principally through a counternotice
procedure, through which they can demand replacement of the
material if the copyright owner fails to initiate a lawsuit.
Copyright-holders have had access to the easy-to-initiate
takedown process afforded by 17 U.S.C. § 512 for nearly eight years,
and a review of the law seems in order. Has this compromise between
industries worked as planned? Has infringing material been removed
from the Internet? How have Internet publishers fared, including
businesses large and small, bloggers, critics, and the many other
speakers who make use of the Internet? How, if at all, has the great
democratization of expression afforded by the Internet been affected
by a simple, expedient extra-judicial procedure for removing
material? These questions are frustratingly difficult to answer, a
difficulty exacerbated by the fact that § 512 takedown notices-a
matter of private action like any other cease-and-desist letter-are not
part of the public record.
But for nearly four years, the Chilling Effects project has
attempted to fill some of the gaps in this knowledge by collecting and
archiving cease-and-desist notices of all kinds. Chilling Effects has
collected § 512 takedown notices from a variety of sources, including
all notices received by Google Inc. For this Article, we analyzed
nearly 900 of these notices along various axes in an attempt to begin
answering some of these questions. Our research is ongoing, and
presumably over time the data set will increase in depth and size. As
such, this is a preliminary evaluation. Insofar as we have begun to
answer some questions, we have also learned enough to raise more
questions and establish directions for further research. Unfortunately,
however, our findings comprise a rather negative snapshot of the
ways in which the § 512 process is being used, and reveal little
benefit to some of the constituencies it was intended to support.
In Part II of this Article, we explain the § 512 process. In Part
III, we sketch the rationale and history behind § 512, and briefly note
some of the predictions, hopes and concerns that § 512 inspired in
industry players, policymakers and commentators. In Parts IV, V, and
VI, we present our study of § 512 notices, including a description of
the data set, our methodology and findings. In Part VII, we analyze
the findings and make some suggestions for change to the safe harbor
scheme set up by § 512.
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II. THE DMCA SECTION 512 PROCESS
Section 512 creates several categories of protection for OSPs. 8
The broadest protection, provided by § 512(a), is a safe harbor for
OSPs who provide transmission and routing-for example,
broadband, DSL, dial-up, and high-speed Internet access providers.
For these types of services, where the OSP is acting as a "mere
conduit" through which information flows, there is no requirement
that the OSP remove material; the law simply gives them safe harbor
from their users' infringements, so long as they adopt a policy for
terminating repeat infringers and accommodate standard technical
protection measures. 9 OSPs that cache information to improve
network performance are required by § 512(b) to respond
"expeditiously" to notices of infringement by removing or disabling
access to the allegedly infringing material when certain conditions are
met and are subject to court-ordered injunctions to remove material.10
The material must have been removed or ordered removed from the
originating site and the content holder must give such notification to
the service provider.
In order to receive safe harbor, hosting services and search
engines are required by § 512(c)-(d) to respond "expeditiously" to
notices of copyright infringement by removing hosted content, or
links to content, when they receive a notice alleging copyright
infringement. 11 Section 512(c) applies to hosted content (websites,
forums, social networking profiles, and the like), and requires OSPs
8. Section 17 USCA § 512(k)(1) defines the various service providers.
9. Connectivity services covered by § 512(a) are subject to court-ordered injunctions to
terminate an infringer's access or to block access to specifically identified locations outside the
United States.
10. See 17 USCA § 512(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii).
11. Section 512(b) requires a notice-and-takedown process for some network providers
who cache content for system efficiency. Our data does not contain notices citing § 512(b)
although it does include some sixteen notices citing Google's search index cache. When doing
the study, we proceeded on the assumption that Google's cache did not fall under the caching
services regulated by § 512(b), for several reasons: (1) we did not consider the cache to be
"intermediate and temporary storage" as defined in § 512(b)(1); (2) the storage is not
automatically carried out after transmission is requested by a user, but performed automatically
at Google's behest, as its spider crawls the web. See Google Web Search Features,
http://www.google.com/intlI/en/help/features.html#cached (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); and (3)
the Google cache appears to operate regardless of whether subsequent users request information
from the original provider. In other words, we understood § 512(b) to apply to an Intemet access
provider, such as a dial-up or broadband provider, who cached repeatedly requested material to
minimize network load and speed transmission. However, two District Courts have just found
safe harbor for Google's search engine cache under § 512(b). Blake A. Field v. Google Inc.,
NO. CV-S-04-0413-RCJ-LRL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10923 (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.eff.org/IP/blake_v_google/google nevada-order.pdf.
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to establish and maintain a complicated process. When an OSP
receives a statutorily compliant notice, 12 it must perform the
following: 1) take down the material "expeditiously"; 2) notify the
alleged infringer that material has been removed; and 3) forward any
counternotices from alleged infringers back to the original
complainant. 13 If after 10-14 days, the complainant has not notified
the OSP that it has filed a lawsuit, then the OSP is to reinstate the
contested material.14
12. The requirements for a statutorily-compliant notice are set forth in 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(3). A valid § 512 (c)(3)(A) notice must contain (i) identification of the copyrighted
work or a representative list of multiple works; (ii) identification of the infringing material; (iii)
information that reasonably allows the OSP to locate the infringing material; and (iv) the
complainant's contact information. The statute further requires (v) a physical or electronic
signature of the complainant; (vi) a statement of good faith that the use of the material is not
authorized; and (vii) a statement under penalty of perjury that the notice is accurate; although so
long as the statute substantially complies with the first four requirements, the OSP must work
with the complainant to bring the notice into full compliance, and then follow the takedown
procedure. If there is substantial compliance, the OSP must contact the complainant to help
bring the notice into full compliance. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). A series of cases in
California and New York have clarified what it means for a copyright holder to "substantially
comply" with the § 512(c)(3) requirements. The courts have emphasized the importance of
including statements of good faith and accuracy and the importance of identifying the allegedly
infringing material to the ISP. Hendrickson v. eBay found invalid certain DMCA notices which
did not contain a statement of good faith and did not identify which copies of a movie were
infringing. Although the copyright holder later verbally clarified to eBay that all copies of the
movie were infringing, this notification was invalid because it was not written. Hendrickson v.
Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In other cases, copyright holders
have written in such blanket identifications with no adverse consequences. For example, ALS
Scan could properly identify infringing material by stating that virtually all images on two
newsgroups violated copyright and by stating each infringing image could be identified by a
copyright notification. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Comtys., Inc. 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
Indeed, according to ALS Scan, any copyright holder alleging multiple infringements need only
provide a representative list of infringing material with one caveat: it is not sufficient to merely
list the copyright holders' names without further identification of specific material (i.e. songs)
and where it is located. Id. Cybernet in Perfect 10 v. Cybernet was found to have a policy that
undermined the DMCA notification procedures when it refused to allow representative lists of
multiple acts of infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1179-80 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Cf Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS),
2002 WL 1997918, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (merely listing ten artists in a letter was
insufficient, at *8-9, but a letter naming particular artists, specific song titles, and printouts of
website screenshots with infringing material did provide adequate notice). Hendrickson v.
Amazon.com further amplified the "representative lists" provision, holding that a copyright
holder cannot rely on a first DMCA notice to validly notify an ISP of subsequent acts of
infringement. Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916-17 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
A complainant must send a new notice identifying and providing location information for new
acts of infringement, because subsequently posted material may be posted at different locations
and in different manners.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
14. Presumably, § 512(g) provides an incentive for the OSP to reinstate the material.
Section 512(g)(1) provides a safe harbor from liability to the OSP's customer for wrongful
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Search engine services are provided safe harbor by § 512(d). In
order to avail themselves of the safe harbor, search engines are also
required to "expeditiously" remove complained-of links from their
search indexes after receiving notice; however, they are not required
to notify the alleged infringer of removal. As search providers likely
have no service relationship with the alleged infringer, they rarely
have the ability to notify, in any case. Links to complained-of
material are thus typically removed from the search engine's index
based only on the copyright holder's takedown notice, without any
notice to the target or other process. While removing material from a
search engine does not remove it from the Internet, it almost certainly
will make it more difficult to locate.
The safe harbor provided by the notice-and-takedown procedure
is explicitly predicated upon the OSP not having actual or
constructive knowledge of infringement before receiving a takedown
notice. 15 Upon receipt of a § 512(c)(3)(A) notification, regardless of
whether the material is actually infringing, and with no independent
examination required, an OSP must comply or risk the loss of safe
harbor and a lawsuit for contributory copyright infringement. 16 The
OSP's compliance is further encouraged by § 512(g)(1), which
exempts it from liability for mistaken yet good faith removal of
material. The OSP must also expeditiously disclose a user's personal
identifying information in accordance with a subpoena issued by the
content holder, 17 as long as the subpoena is accompanied by or
takedown, so long as the § 512(g)(2) requirements are met. In turn, § 512(g)(2) requires putback
within 10-14 days of receipt of a counternotice, so long as the original complainant has not
moved the action to court. Although the preservation of this safe harbor appears to be a strong
incentive to respond to counternotices, the remedies on behalf of the user are, practically
speaking, quite weak. An alleged infringer would have to sue the OSP for wrongful takedown or
failure to put back. As OSP service contracts generally specifically limit the OSP's liability for
removal or loss of material, the actual incentive to put back seems weak when compared to the
incentives to take down. See infra note 26.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
16. "Risk" is the operative word: it is not clear that mere receipt of a notice alleging
infringement should rise to the level of "notice of infringement" required for secondary liability.
Indeed, some scholars have distinguished between the two, and argued that receipt of a
§ 512(c)(3)(A) notification is not equivalent to "notice" for the purpose of determining
secondary copyright liability. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for
Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J.
1833, 1872-80 (2000); Emily Zarins, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the DMCA's Safe
Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV. 257 (2004).
17. The subpoena process does not apply to § 512(a) Internet access providers. Recording
Industry Association of America v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
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follows the receipt of a valid (c)(3)(A) notice. 18 Like 512(a)
providers, § 512(c) providers are required by § 512(i) to adopt and
reasonably implement a policy informing users that accounts of repeat
infringers 19 will be terminated, 20 and to accommodate standard
technical measures used by copyright holders to protect their works. 21
18. A few courts have considered the proper interpretation of particular requirements for
safe harbor and proper § 512(c)(3) notification. The cases' main controversies have focused on
whether a particular web service fits the statutory definition of an ISP, whether the ISP satisfied
the § 512(c)(1)(B) and § 512(i) requirements for safe harbor (see infra note 19), whether the
copyright owner sent the ISP a valid § 512(c)(3) notice (see supra note 12), and what remedies
are available to innocent individual whose material has been removed (see infra note 30). Some
parameters on safe harbor set by courts thus far include a decision that safe harbor does not
extend to violations of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA and that § 512(c)(3)
notifications (as well as § 512(h) subpoenas) cannot be validly served on § 512(a) "mere
conduit" service providers. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
19. Copyright plaintiffs have attempted to prove the OSP is ineligible for safe harbor due
to non-compliance with the § 512(i)(1)(A) requirement that the OSP adopt and reasonably
implement a policy to terminate service to repeat infringers. Courts have generally agreed that
OSPs must establish and reasonably implement such a policy in order to qualify for safe
harbors, but have not yet established firm guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable
implementation. In Ellison v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit agreed that OSPs must indeed
"reasonably implement" a repeat infringer policy. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080
(9th Cir. 2004) (allowing notifications to be sent to an invalid e-mail address raised questions of
fact as to reasonable implementation). Courts have examined the question, but few courts have
withheld safe harbor from ISPs based on failure to "reasonably implement" a policy of
terminating multiple infringers. See Corbis v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (prior termination can demonstrate implementation and imperfect implementation does
not disqualify for the safe harbor); Perfect10 v. CCBilI, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (failure to terminate client accounts after repeat notices is not reasonable implementation).
Plaintiffs have had more success with this argument in the realm of peer-to-peer software
applications. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding
that Aimster had "eviscerated" its ability to reasonably implement a policy by encrypting user
communications), aff'd, 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming injunction based on finding in another motion that
Napster may have failed to adopt a policy in a timely fashion or to reasonably implement it)
(affirming A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, and citing A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000)). It
remains to be seen whether the holdings in the P2P context will be harmonized with the
holdings in other OSP contexts.
20. A number of plaintiffs have argued that an OSP's power to remove or disable access
to material or terminate user accounts disqualifies the OSP from safe harbor under
§ 512(c)(1)(B); that the power to remove content is effectively an editorial function. Four cases
rejected this blanket rule, which would undermine § 512(i) and the general intent of § 512.
Instead, the courts stated an OSP must do more than merely have the power to remove content
to demonstrate an ability to control infringement; for example, advise individual webmasters on
content. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd in part, Ellison
v. Robertson. 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082,
1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md.
2001). In particular, one court emphasized that OSPs do not lose safe harbor by adopting
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Protections for the target of the notice (the alleged infringer) are
relatively few, as material can come down in advance of notice to the
target, and judicial protection is not available unless three things
occur: the target elects to submit a counternotice; the complainant
then files suit; and a court reviews the issue.22 One important
protection for subscribers is receiving notice of the copyright holder's
complaint, which is afforded only to Internet subscribers of hosting
services under § 512(c), and not to beneficiaries or subscribers of
other regulated services, such as § 512(d) search services or § 512(a)
Internet access providers. Section 512(g) requires that the service
provider notify the user in order to maintain a liability exemption for
mistaken removal. 23 This triggers the second important procedural
protection. Alleged infringers, upon notice of takedown, can send a
valid § 512(g)(3) counter-notification to the service provider
containing (A) a physical or electronic signature; (B) identification of
the material removed and its former location; (C) statement under
penalty of perjury that the user has a good faith belief the material
was mistakenly removed; (D) the user's name, address, and phone
number; and (E) consent to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court.
If it receives a valid counternotice, the OSP must then advise the
copyright complainant that it will put back the material in 10-14 days
unless it receives notice from the complainant that the complainant
has filed a court action. 24 Unless a copyright owner chooses not to
seek judicial remedy following receipt of the counter-notification, a
takedown target must be prepared to defend the challenged use in a
Federal District Court. Assuming a lawsuit is not filed, then the target
must hope that the OSP will reinstate the material.
voluntary programs to reduce infringement. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082,
1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Perfectl0 v. CCBilllikewise held that screening for red flag
infringements, blatantly illegal conduct, does not close off the safe harbor. 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077
(C.D. Cal. 2004).
21. What "accommodation" means has yet to be determined.
22. In cases of a knowing, material misrepresentations that the material is infringing, the
alleged infringer also may sue under § 512(f). See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
23. An OSP is not required to notify its consumer that it has removed material. However,
§ 512(g) provides an incentive for hosting service OSPs to do so, by providing a safe harbor
against claims by the user for the OSPs good faith removal of content, if the OSP "takes
reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the
material." § 512(g)(2)(A). A consumer's claims against an OSP are likely limited by the terms
of service, in any case. Thus, e-mail notification to the wrong e-mail address may well suffice,
as might notification to users on vacation, users with temporarily malfunctioning e-mail
accounts, or users with any of a host of other e-mail access problems.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B)-(C).
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The statute provides encouragement to OSPs to replace
wrongfully or mistakenly targeted material. Section 512(g)(1) offers
OSPs a safe harbor from liability to their subscribers for wrongful
takedown, but conditions that safe harbor on § 512(g)(2), which
requires OSPs to notify targets that they will put back material if a
counternotice is received, unless the OSP receives notice that a legal
action was filed. Specifically, the OSP must first notify the
complainant that it "will" reinstate the content within ten business
days after receipt of a counternotice; and then the OSP must
"replace[] ... and cease[] disabling access" to the material within
fourteen days after receipt of a counternotice. 25 However, while in
theory an OSP might be subject to some tort or contractual liability
for a wrongful takedown of content, in practice, OSPs limit their
liability with their terms of service. 26 Hence, although the statute
seeks to encourage putback by providing a safe harbor against
liability for wrongful takedown, in actuality, OSP service contracts
limit most legal or financial incentives for OSPs to do so.
Remedies for bad faith action are provided by § 512(f). Under
§ 512(f), any of the three parties-the copyright holder, the alleged
infringer, or the OSP-can be awarded damages, costs and attorneys'
fees if either the copyright holder or alleged infringer makes knowing,
material misrepresentations in a notice or counternotice. Section
512(f) sets a high bar to recovery: copyright holders may send
insufficient or vague notices, and even send notices on suspicion
instead of diligent investigation, without triggering § 512(f).27 While
high, however, the "material misrepresentations" bar is not
unreachable. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, a District Court
judge found that the copyright holders were subject to § 512(f) for
sending notices because they should have known that reproduction
and distribution of the company's private internal memos, discussing
voting technology flaws, were a fair use.28 Though the court in
Diebold certainly gave some teeth to § 512(f), cases that relate to
materials so widely publicized and so central to democracy are likely
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., AOL Terms of Service, http://about.aol.com/aoInetwork/aolcom terms;
Blogger Terms of Service, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g; Yahoo! Geocities Terms of
Service, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/geoterms.html, Clause 11 ("Yahoo reserves the right
at any time and from time to time to modify or discontinue, temporarily or permanently, the
Service (or any part thereof) with or without notice. You agree that Yahoo shall not be liable to
you or to any third party for any modification, suspension or discontinuance of the Service.").
27. Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).
28. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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rare, 29 and no other § 512(0 cases have dealt such a blow to the
complainant.30 Moreover, for a complainant to "know" with legal
certainty that its complaint targets a non-infringing or fair use is often
unrealistic, given the complexity of copyright infringement analysis
and the famed unpredictability of the fair use defense. 31
In addition to largely unsuccessful reliance on § 512(0,32
accused infringers have also initiated lawsuits against the complaining
copyright holder for intentional interference with contractual
relations, intentional interference with prospective business
29. The Diebold court noted that "[i]t is hard to imagine a subject the discussion of which
could be more in the public interest." Online Policy Group v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195,
1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
30. The Rossi court noted that the cause of action under § 512(f) is limited to situations
where the misrepresentation is "knowing,", and that a subjective belief that materials were
infringing, even if the belief was incorrect, did not qualify as a "knowing" misrepresentation.
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 391 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004). The
Dudnikov court determined that the complainant had not committed a violation of § 512(f)
because MGM had not made "knowing and material misrepresentations" or acted in bad faith in
sending the notice. Dudnikov v. MGM Entertainment, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-D-2512 (PAC),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38511 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005). The MP3Board court found that
inadequate notice does not constitute a "material misrepresentation" for the purposes of
§ 512(f)). Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16165, at 43-46 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).The ALS Scan court hinted, in dicta, at a
broader reading of § 512(f): "To the extent that ALS Scan's claims about infringing materials
prove to be false, RemarQ has remedies for any injury it suffers as a result of removing or
disabling noninfringing material." ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619,
625 (4th Cir. 2001). The Corbis court only briefly discussed "knowing misrepresentation,"
analogizing the § 512(f) standard to the standard of knowledge that an ISP must possess before
potentially liable for secondary copyright liability. Corbis v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1105-06 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
31. David Nimmer, The Public Domain: 'Fairest of Them All' and Other Fairy Tales of
Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 263 (2003) (attempting to objectively assess fair use
cases decided since the 1976 Copyright Act and finding them entirely unpredictable)
("Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors
embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.... Courts must
therefore proceed by the seat of their pants." Id. at 280, 281.). See also Pierre N. Leval, Toward
a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990):
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions
provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of
fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to
result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns. Justification is sought in
notions of fairness, often more responsive to the concerns of private property
than to the objectives of copyright.
Id. at 1106-07.
32. See id.
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advantage, and even intentional infliction of emotional distress. 33
Thus far, none of these claims have succeeded. 34
Section 512 obviously operates in a complex manner; courts
will, of course, continue to develop caselaw around its requirements
and limitations. As we see in Section V, however, the vast majority of
§ 512 notices likely are never subject to the scrutiny of a court. In
part, this was precisely the point behind § 512: the efficient removal
of infringing materials from the Internet in a fair process, with (in
most cases) no need for court review. In the next section, we briefly
sketch the rationale behind § 512 and some concerns that
accompanied its passage.
III. THE RATIONALE BEHIND § 512 AND HISTORICAL CONCERNS
Section 512 grew from Congressional attempts to respond to two
major constituents: the content industry and online service
providers. 35 In 1997, online service providers-ISPs, search engines,
and others-began lobbying Congress for a safe harbor from
secondary liability based on their customers' copyright
infringement. 36 OSPs arguably faced a high degree of uncertainty
about contributory and vicarious liability due to conflicting
interpretations of when they could be held secondarily liable for their
customers' infringement. 37 District Courts in Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom38 and Marobie-FL Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire
Equip Distributors39 had shielded OSPs from liability for users' acts
33. Arista Records, 2002 WL 1997918; MP3Board v. Recording Industry Ass'n of Am.,
Inc., No. C-00-20606 RMW, 2001 WL 804502 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2001) (staying claims until
New York decision; the New York decision denied the California tort claims); Rossi v. Motion
Picutre Ass'n of Am., Inc., 2003 WL 21511750, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12864, No. 02-
00239BMK (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2003), aff'd, Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); Dudnikov v. MGA, No. 03-D-2512 (PAC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38511 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005).
34. Rossi, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12864, at *7-8, * 14.
35. See, e.g., Statement of Senator Hatch, 105th Congress, 144 CONG. REC. S4884-01
(May 14, 1998) ("Title II, for example, reflects 3 months of negotiations between the major
copyright owners and the major OSPs, and ISPs ... ").
36. See Cassandra Imfeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the
Legislative Development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Online Service Provider
Provision, 10 COMM. LAW & POLICY 29 (2005).
37. See Mitchell P. Goldstein. Service Provider Liability for Acts Committed By Users:
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You. 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 591, 613
(2000).
38. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
39. Marobie-FL Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).
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of copyright infringement. At the same time, Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Frena4o and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA41 found bulletin
board operators liable for direct copyright infringement despite the
fact that it was users who-independent of knowledge or control by
the OSP-had uploaded or downloaded the infringing material. 42
OSPs raised concerns about this mix of decisions, and sought greater
certainty from Congress, which took up the concerns and addressed
them with § 512.43
Representatives from major copyright holders, on the other hand,
wanted OSPs to police their networks and opposed any safe harbor
that did not require OSPs to do so. They pointed out that, in 1995, the
Clinton Administration's Information Infrastructure Task Force's
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights had opined that no
legitimate justification existed for giving OSPs special exemption
40. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fl. 1993).
41. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, No. CIV. A. 93-4262 CW, 1997 WL 337558,
(N.D. Cal. June 9, 1997).
42. The expansive reading of vicarious liability in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction inspired
worries that financial revenues derived from providing access to the Internet could result in
vicarious liability, as well. Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). OSPs
were concerned that applications of the Fonovisa standard in the Internet context could result in
a finding that OSP's access fees might constitute "direct financial benefit". Id. See also Michelle
A. Ravn, Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Was Needed
to Chart the Course of Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 755, 785 (1999); 1. TROTTER HARDY, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, PROJECT LOOKING
FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORLD 133 (May 1998),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf. Section 512 guaranteed that the direct
financial benefit prong would not be satisfied by an OSP's collection of general fees but only by
receipt of extra revenue directly generated by access to infringing materials. S. REP. 105-190, at
45. Under §§ 512(c)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(B), OSPs are not liable if, among other things, the OSP
"does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity" (emphasis added).
This restates the vicarious liability standard with a gloss that would apparently exclude
Fonovisa's broader recognition of "substantial financial benefits from admission fees,
concession stand sales and parking fees". Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259, 263. OSPs may still face
vicarious liability, but only if the financial benefit is "directly attributable" to the infringing
activity.
43. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 105-551(1), May 22, 1998, encompassing the submitted favorable
report from the Committee for the Judiciary:
The "On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act" addresses
concerns raised by a number of on-line service and Internet access providers
regarding their potential liability when infringing material is transmitted on-line
through their services. While several judicially created doctrines currently
address the question of when liability is appropriate, providers have sought
greater certainty through legislation as to how these doctrines will apply in the
digital environment.
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from the copyright liability schema.44 The Working Group considered
that OSPs should be no more exempt from policing information for
copyright infringement than photo labs, booksellers and newsstands,
which also face the challenges of policing large amounts of
material.45 Instead, the Working Group recommended reliance on
developing caselaw and judicial contemplation of an OSP's duty to
copyright holders in the face of knowledge of, or direct financial
benefit from, copyright infringement. According to the Working
Group, the business relationship between OSPs and Internet users
justified placing the risk and cost of liability on OSPs.46 Under this
view, placing the burden on OSPs was an efficient choice, as OSPs
could reduce risk with user indemnification agreements and
appropriate insurance. 47 And the threat of monetary liability facing
OSPs was necessary to achieve settlements between OSPs and
copyright owners and to create adequate incentives for OSPs to
control piracy. 48 Likeminded scholars felt that OSPs were best
situated to prevent infringement 49 and that moderate court decisions
focusing on vicarious and contributory liability would produce
solutions that would increasingly converge on a fair and "workable"
standard.50
Amidst these negotiations between the industries and Congress,
consumers of both industries, as well as representatives from
educational institutions and libraries, raised due process and First
Amendment concerns and lobbied for particular concessions. 51
Universities protested that they might too easily be disqualified from
44. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
114-24 (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/.
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 117-18, 123.
48. See Daniel R. Cahoy. Comment: New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service
Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem? 38 IDEA
335, 359 (1998).
49. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway': Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1466, 1492-93 (1995).
50. See Cahoy, supra note 48, at 353.
51. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S4435-04, S4438 (Statement of Senator Leahy). The
Digital Future Coalition (DFC) organized much of the consumer-oriented response, including
heritage organizations, libraries, consumer organizations, and various technology groups.
Among the technology groups were the Home Recording Rights Coalition (HRRC), which has
continued to be active on behalf of consumers and the consumer technology industry. Both the
DFC and HRRC websites include overviews of relevant DMCA legislative history. See DFC,
DMCA Timeline, http://dfc.org/dfcl/ActiveIssues/graphic/graphic.htm; and HRRC, DMCA
Timeline, http://hrrc.org/dmca/dmcahistory.html.
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limited liability because their role as OSPs is complicated by
employer-employee (respondeat superior) relationships with faculty
users. 52 An amendment from Senator Feinstein protected educational
institutions from being held liable for some faculty and graduate
student employees' acts of infringement. 53 Both universities and
libraries had also protested that the proposed extra-judicial procedures
for removing users' material from the Internet violated constitutional
provisions for due process. 54 In response, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary accepted the Ashcroft-Leahy-Hatch amendment, which
added procedural protections in the form of the § 512(g) 55
counternotice process for Internet users to challenge the removal of
material from the Internet. It did not, however, address deeper due
process concerns. Committee members thought, among other reasons,
that Internet service contracts limited any state property law basis for
users' due process claims, and that the procedural protections were
sufficient. 56
With these amendments, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
unanimously decided on April 30, 1998, to favorably report the
52. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
53. 144 CONG. REC. S4889. The Feinstein amendment is codified at 17 USCA § 512(e).
The educational institution would only be liable if under subsection (A) the infringement
involved online access to instructional materials for a course taught within the previous 3 years;
if under subsection (b) the institution received more than two valid notifications of infringement;
or if under subsection (c) the institution failed to inform its users of and promote compliance
with U.S. copyright law.
54.
The second concern raised about the applicability of section 512 to public
universities and libraries, and indeed other public entities which operate as
online service providers, is that by complying with the notice-and-takedown
provisions of section 512, the public entities might violate the due process rights
of their users.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
55. 17 USCA § 512(g).
56.
Any such due process objection suffers at least two flaws. In the first place, a
prerequisite to any due process claim is a state law property interest. In the case
of the relatively new concept of Internet access, the service provider contract,
rather than any common law property interest, would appear to be the yardstick
of the Internet user's property interest in continued access. The contract for
Internet service, therefore, can limit any property interest that would form the
basis for a procedural due process claim. Second, and even more important, the
procedural protections afforded by the notification requirements of subsection
512(c)(3) and the provisions for the replacement of removed or disabled
materials in subsection 512(f) provide all the process that is due.
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
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legislation. 57 The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection did likewise on July 18, 1998, when
it also unanimously decided to favorably report the legislation to the
House, including educational and counter-notification amendments
similar to those added in the Senate. 58 The legislation continued to
receive widespread support.59 Five months later, on October 8, 1998,
the Senate unanimously passed the Conference Report on the
DMCA. 60 The House-Senate conference unanimously supported the
final version of the legislation, 61 and the House passed the legislation
by voice vote on October 12, 1998.62 President Clinton was able to
announce upon his signing of the bill on October 28, 1998, that,
"[t]hrough enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we
have done our best to protect from digital piracy the copyright
industries that comprise the leading export of the United States. ' '63
While debates surrounding the legislation included the limited
discussion noted above, no extended discussion arose concerning the
implications the extra-judicial removal procedure might have on
freedom of expression on the Internet or due process for alleged
infringers. Senator Ashcroft, however, did address his initial concerns
and the purpose behind the counternotice and putback provisions in
remarks on the Senate floor:
Although I was supportive of the affected industries' efforts to
resolve the OSP liability issues, there was one issue which the
industry agreement did not address-what protections would be
given the typical users of the Internet. The agreement protected the
interests of OSPs, and it protected the interests of copyright
owners, but it provided little or no protection for an Internet user
wrongfully accused of violating the copyright laws.
The original draft would have left these wrongly injured, innocent
users with limited recourse. They would have to hire an attorney
and go to court to have the court require the OSP and copyright
holder to allow the web page to go back up-in other words the
end user would have to go to court to prove their innocence. I
found this situation to be totally unacceptable. Even though several
57. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 7 (1998).
58. H.R. REP. 105-551(11), available at 1998 WL 414916, at 28.
59. See 144 CONG. REC. S12730-01.
60. H.R. 2281. 144 CONG. REC. S12375-02, S12375.
61. 144 CONG. REC. S11887-01, S1187.
62. 144 CONG. REC. S12375-02, S12375.
63. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671, 1998 WL
971790 (Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 228).
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Judiciary Committee members claimed that no amendments were
needed I made sure that the industry compromise protected the
rights of the typical Internet user by offering an amendment that
provided protection included [in] my original bill-an idea referred
to as notice and put back. If material is wrongly taken down from
an Internet user's home page because the original notice
mistakenly did not take into account that the Internet user was only
making a fair use of the copyrighted work, my amendment ensures
that the end-user will be given notice of the action taken, and gives
them a right to initiate a process that allows them to put their
material back on-line, without the need to hire a lawyer and go to
court. This was a critical improvement over the industry's
compromise agreement. 64
Whether the procedural protections provided by § 512 are
sufficient to address concerns, however, has thus far been unclear.
Additionally, whether the planned benefits of § 512 have come to
fruition is a question that has been unanswered. In theory, granting
OSPs safe harbor from contributory copyright infringement for their
removal of material in response to a DMCA notice has several
benefits. First, it greatly diminishes any incentive for OSPs to monitor
their users' Internet expression for fear of secondary liability. Second,
it is, at least theoretically, less burdensome on OSPs than any scheme
that would require them to monitor their users' behavior. Third, it is a
quick and easy way for victims of copyright infringement to short-
circuit Internet distribution of copyrighted material-probably faster,
and certainly much less expensive, than obtaining a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction from a court. The alleged
infringer is in the position of having material removed before any
court review; but the counternotice procedure is also quick and easy.
While § 512 provides victims of copyright infringement a quick,
simple way to police their copyrights on the Internet, concerns arise
from two directions. First, implementing § 512 is at least a moderate
burden on OSPs, who have to establish procedures and absorb the
cost of enforcement. For small providers especially, this may be a
greater burden than anticipated during debate over § 512. Second,
alleged infringers are subject to removal of their expressive materials,
not only before a judge reviews the complaint, but likely even before
they receive notice of a complaint. Further, while they have the
64. 144 CONG. REC. S4884-01, 4889 (May 14, 1998) (Statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
2006] EFFICIENT PROCESS OR "CHILLING EFFECTS"? 637
opportunity to send a countemotice, the material, once removed,65
must stay down at least 10-14 days according to the statute. The
effect may be to substantially burden expressive and other individual
rights. In the case of expressive materials, this could be especially
significant: ten days to two weeks may greatly diminish the value of
the call to a protest, the competitive price, or the newsworthy blog
entry.
These competing visions of § 512 have persisted since it took
effect. Some legal commentators heralded § 512's enactment as the
economic salvation of the Internet.66 Undeniably, § 512 demonstrates
that Congress recognized both OSPs' concerns about a crisis facing
them in the courts, and the rationality of limiting their liability. 67 Not
all observers applauded, however. A few commentators argued that
§ 512 struck the wrong balance and failed copyright holders by
removing incentives-by, in fact, providing disincentives-for OSPs
to monitor their networks and prevent copyright infringement, despite
the fact that they were in the best position to do so. 68 Another camp of
critics doubted the rosy picture of user rights. These commentators
were supportive of a rule that discouraged OSPs from monitoring
65. The statute is silent as to the situation where a user does receive notice, and sends a
counternotice back to the OSP before the material is removed. In an era of rapid
communications, it is possible that this situation could arise.
66. See Jennifer L. Kostyuu, Comment, Copyright Infringement on the Internet:
Determining the Liability oflnternet Service Providers, 48 CATH. U.L. REV. 1237, 1270 (1999);
Michelle A. Ravn. Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Was
Needed to Chart the Course of Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 755, 785-86 (1999); Conference: Franklin Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial
Intellectual Property System Major Problems Conference Digital Technology and Copyright: A
Threat or a Promise?, 39 IDEA 291, (Comments of Mr. Frank Politano, Mr. Matt Oppenheim)
(1999); Steven E. Halpem. New Protections for Internet Service Providers: An Analysis of "The
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 359, 406-07
(1999).
67. A number of courts, and commentators, have compared the § 512 safe harbor with 47
U.S.C. § 230, expressing dismay that tortious speech on the Internet receives less sanction than
copyright infringement. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Barret v.
Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (previously published at 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379) (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (certified for partial publication). See also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335 (2005); Sarah Duran, Note, Hear No Evil, See
No Evil, Spread No Evil: Creating a Unified Legislative Approach to Internet Service Provider
Immunity, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115 (2004); Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers,
Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295 (2002).
68. See, e.g., Colin Folawn, Neighborhood Watch: The Negation of Rights Caused by the
Notice Requirement in Copyright Enforcement Under the DMCA, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 979
(2003).
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their users, but worried that the takedown procedures abrogated due
process and could chill Internet expression.69
Under the latter critics' view, § 512 gives OSPs strong incentives
to maintain their safe harbor and few incentives to question takedown,
even in instances where a secondary liability suit would likely fail and
even in instances where allegations of copyright infringement are
dubious. 70 Under this paradigm, users are inadequately protected by
§ 512's provision that invalid notices would not give rise to OSP
liability under the awareness standard. The OSP bears the risk of
liability if it decides to ignore a notice as invalid if, after the fact, a
court deems the notice to substantially comply with the statute's
provisions. Similarly, the OSP would lose the safe harbor if it decided
not to comply with a particular notice in the belief that a copyright
holder knowingly misrepresented the allegation of infringement when
the copyright holder had simply made a mistake or otherwise did not
have the requisite intent to misrepresent. Since the OSP is largely
immunized from acting on a notice in good faith 7' but not from
failing to act on a notice in good faith, the OSP is likely to always err
on the side of caution and on the side of the complaining copyright
holder.72 The statute also requires the OSP to assist the copyright
holder in issuing a technically valid notice, further diminishing
incentives to ignore faulty notices. Given the overall incentive
structure set out by the statute, it is likely in the OSP's interest, in
69. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888 (2000);
Emily Zarins, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the DMCA's Safe Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV.
257, 291-95 (2004).
70. See Conference: Franklin Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial Intellectual Property
System Major Problems Conference, Digital Technology and Copyright: A Threat or a
Promise? 39 IDEA 291, 301-03 (Statement of Mr. Jeremy Williams); Mark D. Robins, Counter
Notification Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Gap in the Safe Harbor,
CYBERSPACE LAWYER, Nov. 1999, at 5; Malla Pollack, The Right to Know? Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause
and the First Amendment, 17 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 109 (1999); Alfred C. Yen,
Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability,
and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1883 (2000).
71. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for firther discussion about the practical
limitations of OSP liability for takedown.
72. See Conference: Franklin Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial Intellectual Property
System Major Problems Conference Digital Technology and Copyright: A Threat or a Promise?
39 IDEA 291, 372 (Statement of Mr. Bill Murphy predicting OSPs will comply even with
dubious notices such as those sent by the Church of Scientology to silence critics).
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terms of time and efficiency, to act on the faulty notice rather than
pursue a valid one. 73
Procedurally, § 512 substitutes the OSP's self-interested
mediation of copyright infringement for official and neutral judicial
mediation. Internet users enter the process to defend their use of
material only after the private process has resulted in the equivalent of
a temporary restraining order being issued against the user. As
putback is, practically, not guaranteed,74 the § 512(c) and (d) notice-
and-takedown process, therefore, effectively constitutes an extra-
judicial temporary restraining order, based solely on the copyright
holder's allegation of copyright infringement. Even after the alleged
infringer issues a challenge to the allegations, this TRO-like situation
remains in effect as long as the copyright owner is willing to sue
within the 10-14 days and regardless of the likelihood of success on
the merits. 75 In addition, the remedies available to alleged infringers
whose expression is improperly subject to a takedown are generally
limited to situations where there was "knowing material
misrepresentation" by the entity filing the DMCA notice. Legally
speaking, this is a difficult standard to meet.
Supporters were also dismissive of these user-oriented concerns,
arguing that, far from chilling speech, § 512 actually would promote
the democratic quality of the Internet. Under this view, the fact that
§ 512 confers no duty on OSPs to police their users protects users
from a significant chilling of constitutionally protected expression. 76
Indeed, following § 512's adoption, strategists advised businesses to
reduce all monitoring of their hosting and linking services and all
control of users' activities in order to avoid triggering the "facts and
circumstances" knowledge standard in § 512(c)(1)(a)(ii) and
§ 512(d)(1)(A)(B). 77 Furthermore, the Associate Register for Policy
73. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEo. L.J. 1833, 1884 (2000);
Thorny Legal Issues: Web Site Provider Liability For User Content and Actions, MULTIMEDIA
& WEB STRATEGIST. Vol 5, No. 4. Jan. 1999.
74. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for further discussion about the practical
limitations of OSP liability for takedown.
75. In addition, we have found little evidence of either counternotice use or putback. See
infra Section V.G. While this is a continuing research question for us, if putback is not occurring
in appropriate circumstances, the process becomes more akin to an extra-judicial injunction than
a TRO-a dramatic realignment of traditional legal procedures that protect defendants.
76. Steven E. Halpern. New Protections for Internet Service Providers: An Analysis of
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 359, 407-
08 (1999).
77. Thorny Legal Issues: Web Site Provider Liability for User Content and Actions.
MULTIMEDIA & WEB STRATEGIST. Vol. 5, No. 4. Jan. 1999.
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and International Affairs of the United States Copyright Office
thought that § 512 offered legitimate users more substantive
protection than the informal system of notice and takedown that OSPs
and copyright holders were then practicing. 78 Under the pre-§ 512
regime of informal arrangements, users had to establish elements of a
common law claim against an OSP who improperly removed
material; Section 512's process handed users a new statutory cause of
action directly against the content owner whereby the user could be
reimbursed for costs incurred for wrongful takedowns.79
Overall, those who are concerned about § 512's possible effects
point out that the question of secondary liability for OSPs is unsettled
anyway, and that the medicine may prove worse than the disease of
uncertainty. 80 Moreover, the more OSPs rely upon the DMCA safe
harbor, the less opportunity courts will have to clarify existing
caselaw on OSP liability, and the more DMCA compliance, with its
attendant bias toward takedown (see, e.g, infra), will be "a permanent
feature of the legal landscape" for OSPs.81 In addition, while there is
some conflicting caselaw on § 512(c) (hosted material) situations,
providing mere hypertext links through a search engine seems
unlikely under current law to result in secondary liability for search
OSPs in the first place, regardless of § 512(d)'s putative "safe
harbor." 82
If notices are generally sent when copyright infringement is
clear-cut-the assumption behind the positive story of the DMCA-
Section 512 may represent an efficient way to clear infringing
78. Conference: Franklin- Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial Intellectual Property
System Major Problems Conference Digital Technology and Copyright: A Threat or a Promise?
39 IDEA 291 (1999).
79. Section 512(f). See also, Conference: Franklin Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial
Intellectual Property System Major Problems Conference Digital Technology and Copyright: A
Threat or a Promise? 39 IDEA 291 (1999).
80. The watershed case that came down prior to the passage of § 512 is Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The
court in this case said that an online service provider could be held liable for its users'
infringement if it had notice of the infringement and materially contributed to it. It is not entirely
clear that the caselaw would have continued to develop in this direction, though the § 512
takedown procedures seem to assume a duty on the part of hosting and search OSPs.
81. Alfred C. Yen. Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment. 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 at 1888 (2000).
82. TicketMaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL
525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (even deep-linking did not violate copyright law, because
source was clear); Bernstein v. J.C. Penny, Inc., No. 98-2958 R EX, 1998 WL 906644 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (linking to a site that linked to another site containing infringing materials
did not constitute contributory infringement). But see Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) (hyperlinks were infringing).
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materials from the Internet. If this is the case, then shifting the burden
to alleged infringers and costs to OSPs may represent a useful
compromise, and the incentives for OSPs to err on the side of
takedown will be less troubling. On the other hand, if notices are sent
when copyright infringement is alleged but unclear, or defective
notices are the norm-the assumption behind the negative view of the
DMCA-Section 512 may represent a wolf in sheep's clothing,
allowing First Amendment-protected expression to be removed from
the Internet cheaply, expeditiously, and without check.
With these competing visions of the DMCA in mind, we
conducted a study of § 512 takedown notices. We hoped to begin
describing in general terms how the § 512 process is being used.
Additionally, we hoped to find out whether its use to date (at least as
reflected by our data) best supports the positive view or the negative
one.
IV. THE STUDY: THE CHILLING EFFECTS PROJECT AND DATA SET
Studying the uses of the § 512 notice-and-takedown procedure
poses challenges, since it involves only private party action-cease-
and-desist letters-and no public record-keeping. We have, however,
developed a data set through the Chilling Effects project, which
collects, annotates, and publishes cease-and-desist letters related to
Internet expression. 83 The Chilling Effects project consists of a
consortium of law school clinics and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation; and since January 2002, the project has collected cease-
and-desist letters on a variety of intellectual property and other
online-speech-related doctrines such as defamation. Students and
faculty (including the authors, at various times) at the Samuelson
Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, University of California,
Berkeley, have reviewed and annotated § 512 notices for the site.
Our present data set includes 876 notices submitted to Chilling
Effects through August 2005. We have generally split this into two
effective data sets for statistical analysis. First, the project includes all
notices submitted to Google Inc., since March 2002, (734 notices as
of August 2005), which we refer to throughout as "Google" notices.
Second, the project also includes self-reported notices submitted,
usually by recipients, to Chilling Effects through online web forms
(142 notices), which we refer to throughout as "self-reported" or
"non-Google" notices, as appropriate. See Fig. 1.
83. See Chilling Effects, http://chillingeffects.org/.
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Fig. 1. The Chilling Effects § 512 data set, broken down by DMCA
Section and recipient OSP (Google and NonGoogle OSPs).
The data set is subject to two obvious limitations. First, notices
from Google-a single company-constitute 84% of the entire set;
further, two-thirds of the Google data are related to search services,
rather than hosting. This predominance of search notices skews the
entire set toward characteristics of search index takedowns. The
Google data set, however, is very robust in that it contains all notices
received by Google over the observed time period; as such, it
provides a complete picture of a major online service provider's
interaction with § 512.
A second significant limitation is that the other set of notices-
the set of "non-Google" notices-is relatively small, and largely
individually self-reported. As such, these notices may skew towards
the substantively flawed; it seems plausible that individuals who have
a strong defense (or at least believe there is a strong defense) are more
likely to submit their notices to the Chilling Effects database. 84 We
84. The Chilling Effects project makes no determination on the merit of any notice, and
publishes all notices regardless of whether they are problematic. Just the same, the very name of
the site may lead people to over-report problematic notices. In any case, it seems probable that
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approached these notices cautiously; however, a third of the notices
from Google relate to hosted material, rather than search index links.
This gives us a non-self-selected group of notices related to hosted
material, although, again, a group limited to one company. We make
allowances for these flaws by separating the two sets in most
analyses. Additionally, we note places where our findings may be
limited by the vagaries of the set. Fortunately, the Chilling Effects
project has also obtained an additional set of more than 1600 notices
received by The Planet, a Texas-based web host and access ISP, from
September 15, 2004 to the present. For near-future research, the data
set from The Planet will be very important for checking conclusions
and comparing search engine and self-reported data with a complete
set from a hosting service.
V. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
In order to obtain the detailed picture of the process we desired,
we needed to evaluate each notice, at least briefly, based on its
complaints and the underlying facts, in addition to recording basic
information about the senders, recipients, targets, etc. For this reason,
we repeatedly encountered a critical component of copyright law: its
fact-specific nature. Copyrightability, infringement, and fair use are
all analyses that are subject to change, depending on the person
analyzing the case. For this reason, there was no way to avoid
judgment calls when coding notices for substantive legal flaws, but
we attempted to limit any issues by conservatively classifying notices
and by using multiple reviewers for each notice, as well as using a
coding worksheet with detailed guidelines for coding. After each
notice had been reviewed at least twice, one of the authors went back
through to check that reviewers had converged on a common
approach to coding.
Fair use is notoriously difficult to define, so we approached it
carefully. We coded notices for favored use, such as parody, news,
commentary and reporting. We avoided fair use claims that would
rely only on the small amount of copying (though we did include non-
copyrightable snippets such as titles in our substantively-flawed set).
We looked particularly at the transformativeness, the purpose, and the
commerciality of the use, and steered clear of counting many arguable
or borderline fair uses. We took a similarly conservative approach to
other substantive flaws, such as non-copyrightable subject matter. For
those who think they are in the "right"-whether senders or recipients of notices-are more
likely to publish the notices on a public website.
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example, we coded notices citing purely factual matter or
noncopyrightable systems or methods, such as recipes or statistical
methodologies as "noncopyrightable subject matter." But we chose
not to code for noncopyrightable subject matter unless the subject
matter plainly represented such a question. For instance, numerous
notices alleged copyright infringement of "website design" or
"layout," which certainly raise possible defenses along the lines of
copyrightability. However, we did not code such notices as
noncopyrightable subject matter.
We also sorted senders and recipients into various categories,
such as "hobbyist" or "competitor," terms which are subject to
definitional judgment calls. Again, we took care not to stray from
fairly conservative characterizations of these categories. A party
classed as a "competitor" generally is in the same, or a very closely
related, business as the adverse party. "Hobbyists" include bloggers,
fan sites and the like.
Notices were stored in a MySQL database, and coded according
to the attributes described below. In addition, some attributes were
tagged via keywords. We extracted information from the database
using queries on both the coded attributes and the keyword tags.
VI. OBSERVATIONS
A. General Observations
The overall set of 876 cease-and-desist notices includes 514
notices (59%) making a complaint only under § 512(d) (search engine
index link); and 315 notices (36%) making a complaint only under
§ 512(c) (hosted material). In addition, 68 § 512(c)-like notices were
sent to OSPs complaining of material residing on a user's computer.
In other words, these notices ask for "takedown" in a situation where
§ 512(a)-the straight safe harbor for routing and communications-
likely actually applies. 85 A few notices (22, or 3%) included claims
85. Parenthetically, we note that under our analysis, the data set includes no notices that
reference § 512(b), although 16 notices mention Google's search index cache. In our analysis,
we had determined that Google's search engine cache was not covered by § 512(b); see supra
note 11 for our reasoning. Two recent District Court decisions, however, indicate towards re-
analysis of the current dataset with respect to § 512(b) claims. Blake A. Field v. Google Inc.,
NO. CV-S-04-0413-RCJ-LRL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10923, (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2006); Gordon
Roy Parker v. Google, Inc., Civil Action No. 04-CV-3918, 2006 WL 680916 (E.D.Pa. March
10, 2006). The Blake A. Field court found that Google received a § 512(b) safe harbor for its
search engine cache. Given our thinking when undertaking the study, we had concluded that the
dearth of apparent § 512(b) notices in our dataset suggested that the technically-detailed
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under more than one statutory section. Of the 514 § 512(d) search
engine claims, only a few were sent to search engines other than
Google. The vast majority of these notices were sent to Google solely,
and a few were sent to multiple OSPs including Google. The high
incidence of § 512(d) claims is, of course, due to the predominance of
notices to Google in our data set. While Google submits all of its
notices to Chilling Effects, two-thirds of its notices are for its search
engine listings. Google-provided hosting services-including
Blogger, UseNet and Google Groups archives-account for about a
third of Google's total notices. 86 See Fig. 1, above.
1. Google Notices: General Observations
We first note that there has been an increase over time in notices
sent to Google, but that we cannot reliably tell from our data whether
this represents a continuing upward trend. Section 512(c) and (d)
notices both increased in the Google set from 2002 to 2005. See Fig.
2. In the somewhat more than three years' worth of data that we
evaluated, the total number of § 512(c) and (d) notices submitted to
the database increased from 70 in 2002 (March-December); to 151
notices in 2003; to 253 notices in 2004; to 245 in just the first seven
months of 2005.
§ 512(b) provision was little used by either complainants or OSPs. However, should the Field
and Parker interpretation of § 512(b) carry the day, then that provision will indeed provide an
important protection for OSPs. Therefore, we will. likely be revising our metric with respect to
§ 512(b), and re-analyzing the current dataset as well as examining the dataset from The Planet
for any relevant notices.
86. We have assumed that Usenet postings residing on an ISP's server are an instance of
§ 512(c) services. However, at least one case analyzed them as a § 512(a) service. Ellison v.
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See generally
Sean Croman, Where the Netcom Yardstick Comes Up Short: Courts Should Not Apply the Facts
of Netcom as an Example of Intermediate and Transient Storage Under § 512(a) of the DMCA,
80 WASH. L. REv. 417 (2005) (discussing this inconsistency, and arguing that Usenet hosts
should be considered § 512(c) providers). We agree.
646 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.I. [Vol. 22
Google Notices, 512(c) and 512(d) Compared,
March 2002 - July 2005
35
30 - -512(c) Notices
25 - - 512(d) Notices20 --- 512(c) Trend
10-
5 ^
0
Fig. 2. Section 512(c) and 512(d) notices being sent to Google.
We had expected that some of the increase in total numbers of
notices would have come through growth in visibility and awareness
of the Chilling Effects project itself, but on examining the data it
became apparent that most of the growth has come thus far from an
increase in actual notices submitted to Google during the period in
question. The number of notices actually sent and received by Google
over almost the same period of time (April 2002-June 2005) has
increased from an average of four per month in 2002 to eighteen per
month for the first six months of 2005.87 However, it was impossible
to confidently determine whether there is a forward trend in the
87. We began counting Chilling Effects submissions in January 2002. While Chilling
Effects officially opened in February, coordinators had already begun collecting notices. The
Google submissions began in March 2002, and Google-only tables and Google-comparison
tables date from March 2002. For timeline and trendline purposes, we cut off analysis of both
sets of data with July 2002, which was the last month that seemed relatively complete. The
Chilling Effects database is a live database, which means that its data set changes over time. A
user may decide in 2006 to submit a notice or series of notices that they received years earlier.
Such data, while they may not be statistically significant, are still useful in terms of anecdotal
evidence of usage. Moreover, if a large set of older data is suddenly deposited and analyzed, the
statistical picture could change. For this reason, we have chosen to be careful with our analyses
of the significance of pieces of the data set.
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data.88 (Though the chart visually appears to show an increasing
trend, the R-squared values for the lines of best fit reveal (1) that the
seeming increase is only weakly predictive for §512(d) notices (R2 =
0.60); and (2) that we cannot predict with confidence whether the
512(c) notices will increase over time, at all (R2 = 0.33).) Further,
without a broader set of notices than we have, it is obviously
impossible to determine whether use of the § 512 process generally is
increasing or not.
The § 512(d) search engine notices do appear to have increased
more dramatically than the § 512(c) hosted content notices sent to
Google, and there is, overall, a much greater volume of § 512(d)
notices in the set. This is true even though Google increased its
§ 512(c) offerings steadily during the study period.89 Of the increases
in § 512 notices noted in the Google set and accordingly in the set of
notices as a whole, it is plain that most are § 512(d) notices. See Figs.
2 and 3. The set of § 512(d) notices sent to Google has increased from
an average of three notices per month in the second and third quarters
of 2002, to an average of 21 per month in the second quarter of
2005.90
Whether considered separately by OSP, section, or as a whole,
the number of notices collected during any given month is small
enough-5 to 45 notices-that a single spate of notices from an
aggrieved user can cause a notable spike in the set. In February 2004,
for instance, the American Poolplayers Association sent twenty
notices to Google for UseNet archives, creating a visible spike in the
§ 512(c) collection. See Figs. 2 and 3. Likewise, just two months
prior, in December of 2003, Mir Internet Marketing sent eighteen
notices to Google, spiking the § 512(d) data set. This wide variability
88. The period of time we have so far is relatively small (less than four years), the overall
numbers received are small, and the numbers received in any given period of time vary
significantly, resulting in very different standard deviations across almost any period of time we
examined.
89. Online forums of various sorts continue to grow in kind and number, and Google has
moved into these markets, both old and new. In 2001, Google took over Deja.com's UseNet
Discussion Service UseNet archives, maintaining them as Google Groups. In addition to UseNet
feeds, Google Groups users can establish their own discussion groups, hosted by Google, and
maintained in the Google Groups hierarchy. In 2003, Google purchased Blogger, which
provides Blog*spot services, one of the major free bloghosts. See Elise Bauer, An Overview of
the Weblog Tools Market, Aug. 6, 2004,
http://www.elise.com/web/a/an-overview-of the weblog_toolsmarket.php and Elise Bauer,
Feb. 15, 2005, Weblog Tools Market - Update February 2005,
http://www.elise.com/web/a/weblogtools-marketupdatefebruary2005.php.
90. The standard deviation varied significantly, making it difficult to determine any trend.
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month-to-month is obvious from Fig. 2, and shown in more detail in
Fig. 3.
512(c)
avg stdev
512(d) 512(c) & (d)
avg stdev avg stdev
2002 4 3 3 1 4 2
Q3,2002 4 1 3 2 4 2
_Q4, 2002 3 1 6 2 4 2
Ajl, 2003 5 3 13 3 12 9
_Q2, 2003 4 4 4 2 4 3
32003 3 2 10 7 7 6
_Q4, 2003 7 1 18 2 13 8
Q1 2004 13 16 14 7 13 11
Q2, 2004 4 1 17 5 11 8
Q3,2004 9 3 11 5 10 4
Q4, 2004 11 2 11 5 11 3
1,2005 9 1 21 8 15 8
Q2, 2005 15 1 26 7 21 8
Fig. 3. Notices to Google, monthly averages per quarter, April 2002-
June 2005.
The preliminary data from The Planet is not yet extensive
enough to fully determine trends, or compare with the other notices.
We note, however, that The Planet receives many more notices
monthly than Google, and so will provide a rich sample of data to
review for trends in future work, particularly over longer periods of
time than we have yet been able to observe. 91 See Fig. 4.
91. The data from The Planet is only approximate at this point. We receive the notices in
batches and detailed analysis is needed to truly gauge how many notices are received daily.
Consequently, the very rough data set we currently have is broken down only into monthly
totals, which still show significant fluctuations month-to-month, ranging from a low of 79
received in September 2004 to a high of 207 notices received May 2005. We also note that the
averages and totals may be artificially suppressed by the last month of data, which is likely not
complete. In this early analysis, we left August of 2005 in the calculations, although we are
aware that some additional notices dated from that month might subsequently arrive.
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ThePlanet - Monthly Notice Totals,
September 2004 to August 2005
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Fig. 4. Numbers of notices sent to The Planet, Sept. 2004-Aug. 2005.
2. Self-reported Notices; General Observations
We also examined the self-reported set of notices. Here we note
that nearly half the notices were sent in response to a situation where
§ 512(a) would likely apply-largely situations where alleged
infringers are trading files across peer-to-peer networks. Fig. 1,
above. In fact, § 512(a) establishes a straightforward safe harbor for
OSPs acting as conduits, with no notice-and-takedown procedure.
Further, because complained-of files reside on user machines, the
OSP cannot take down the material in the first place. In instances
where the user is engaged in simple distribution of entire copyrighted
works, we may presume that the underlying copyright complaint is
strong, although defenses, such as the misidentification of the alleged
infringer, may certainly apply. However, because § 512(a) does not
authorize takedown notices, these notices raise other issues. We
discuss this result further below.
B. Sender Characteristics
We examined the characteristics of those using the § 512
processes in our data set.
1. Corporate Senders
In our data set, corporations and business entities were the
primary users of the § 512(c) (hosting) and § 512(d) (search)
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processes, and the primary senders of notices related to § 512(a)
services (64 notices, 94%).92 Fig. 5. Of Google § 512(c) notices,
corporate and business senders made up 72% (171 notices) of the
senders. 93 Among self-reported § 512(c) notices, corporate and
business senders made up 65% of notices. 94 Among § 512(d) notices,
the large majority, 409 (79%), were sent on behalf of corporate or
business entities. 95
Who Sends § 512 Notices
Uncategorized
U Google
Non-Profit/Public
Individual
Corporate II
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Fig. 5. Categories of§ 512 Complainants.
Beyond the general fact that business entities sent the large
majority of notices, there were some interesting specifics. Section
512(c) and (d) senders in our data set are often small Internet
92. Apparent non-profit/public interest entities also sent a minority of the notices. 15 of
236 Google § 512(c) notices (6.3%) were apparently sent by or on behalf of non-profit or public
interest organizations. Google received 12 (2.3%) of its § 512(d) notices from or on behalf of
apparent non-profit or public interest entities. Additionally, 7 self-reported § 512(c) notices
(10.2%) were sent by or on behalf of nonprofit or public interest entities.
93. Some notices had more than one sender, and some senders could not be classified. The
set of senders of Google § 512(c) notices was 236; 171 were sent by corporations and business
entities.
94. Some notices had more than one sender, and some senders could not be classified. The
set of senders of self-reported § 512(c) notices was 68; 44 were sent by corporations and
business entities.
95. All six of the self-reported § 512(d) notices were sent by corporations and business
entities.
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businesses. A large percentage of Google search notices-55% of the
Google § 512(d) notices-are competition-related. 96 Entities send
these notices to request the removal of links to their competitors. 97
(This phenomenon is discussed further, below.) The software and
game industries sent 23% of the § 512(c) notices (70 unique notices).
These were largely related to circumvention of technological
protection measures;98 a significant percentage included other claims
of questionable relevance to the § 512 takedown procedures,
including license restrictions, resales, game "cheats," and the like.
Perhaps surprisingly, neither § 512(d) search nor § 512(c)
hosting notices in our data set show significant use by the movie and
music industries. While, as noted supra in Section III, these industries
anticipated and helped draft the notice and takedown provisions in
§ 512(c) and (d), our data show them only rarely using these
provisions. Corporate and business entities are generally responsible
for the lion's share of notices, but the movie and music industries
combined were responsible for only 6% of the § 512(c) notices and
only 3% of the § 512(d) notices. The lack of entertainment companies
in our set may be, at least in part, because they choose not to send
search engine complaints; however, we suspect that is not the entire
story.
While we did not see nearly the number of § 512(c) or (d)
notices we expected from it, the movie industry (followed by the
computer software and games, and then music, industries) sent the
vast majority of § 512(a) "takedown notices"--where takedown is
neither required nor possible, but where complaints about an alleged
infringer might convince the OSP to terminate the alleged infringer's
service-in our data set. Our data do not reflect the very high
numbers (in the tens of thousands annually) of notices received by
larger OSPs from the content industry, but the use of § 512(a)
apparent in our very limited data has been anecdotally verified
through a confidential interview discussing numbers from larger
96. See supra Section V for a description of the way we used the term "competitor."
97. A relatively high number, 35%, of Google notices are coded "unclassifiable" or "no
information" with respect to sender characteristics. This is because § 512 notices do not always
contain a great deal of detail. Given this, it may be that percentages are not entirely accurate
across the data set.
98. Illegal circumvention, by itself, is not properly the subject of a § 512 notice, at least
according to one court. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Section 512(c) provides protection only from liability for copyright
infringement. Plaintiffs seek to hold defendants liable not for copyright infringement, but for a
violation of Section 1201(a)(2), which applies only to circumvention products and technologies.
Section 512(c) thus does not apply here.") (internal citations omitted).
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OSPs, among other sources. 99 We look forward to examining this
empirically with data from The Planet. If this § 512(a) effect is borne
out, it seems likely that complaints about infringing movies and songs
now focus on peer-to-peer networks, where the OSP acts only as a
conduit. This change (unanticipated when the statute was drafted and
passed) might help explain the relatively few copyright industry
§ 512(c) and (d) notices we collected. If true, this suggests that the
copyright industry's concerns about piracy are currently not well-
addressed by the notice-and-takedown process.
2. Individual Senders
Individuals constitute a significant minority of all senders in both
the § 512(c) and § 512(d) contexts. Of Google § 512(c) notices,
20.7% of notices are apparently sent by, or on behalf of, individual
rights-holders (49 of 236). Among non-Google § 512(c) notices, 17
(25%) were sent by or on behalf of apparent individuals. The situation
is not markedly different among senders of § 512(d) notices. Google
received 92 (17.9%) of its § 512(d) notices from, or on behalf of,
individuals.
As might be expected, complaints sent on behalf of individuals
vary considerably; it would be difficult to describe a "typical"
complaint. For example, one individual complainant cited a blogger
who had repeatedly re-posted entire posts without crediting the
original author. 100 Another individual wrote to request the removal of
a book cover from a review site (the review, we note, was critical). 101
Another complaint was apparently from a person unhappy with the
99. Confidential interview. See also Pleadings, Pacific Bell Internet Services v. RIAA,
No. C 03-3560 SI, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2003) (Source on file with Author). In 2002, Pacific Bell
Internet Services and its affiliates received more than 16,700 notices from MediaForce alone.
Greg Wrenn, Associate General Counsel for Yahoo!, Inc., reported similarly high volumes, of
several thousand notices each calendar quarter. A Look Back at the Notice-Takedown Provisions
of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act One Year After Enactment, WIPO Workshop on
Service Provider Liability, Dec. 1, 1999. The Yahoo! notices, however, are likely a mix of
§ 512(a), (c), and (d) notices. We note that at that time, Mr. Wrenn observed that few users used
the counter-notification procedures. He estimated that at that time, 5% of notices were "shams"
using the system to silence or harass critics, citing the Scientologists. Our data suggest to us that
many notices exhibit substantive problems beyond obvious cases of attempts to silence or harass
critics.
100. Notice # 1046, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1046 (dated
Jan. 9, 2004). The same complainant later filed a similar complaint against a different party.
Notice # 1442, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD= 1042 (dated Sept. 20,
2004).
101. Notice # 1362 http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5I2/notice.cgiNoticelD=1362 (dated
July 1, 2004) (as of Oct. 2005, the book cover was still included with the review).
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use of his photograph on a website dedicated to criticizing his alleged
disreputable character and dating habits. 102
3. Repeat Senders
A quarter of the senders in our database are repeat senders, and
were responsible for more than half of all the notices. Of the 436
unique senders, 25% are repeat senders, and 329 (75%) sent only one
notice. In all, 547 (62.4%) of the notices were sent by repeat
senders 103 Within the 107 (25%) of repeat senders, 86 (20%) sent 2-5
notices; 10 (2%) sent 6 to 10 notices; six (1%) sent 11 to 20 notices;
and five senders104 (1%) sent more than 20 notices-ranging from 21
to 54 notices.
The relatively few senders that sent large batches of notices are a
significant presence in the dataset (the top 11 senders sent 29% of the
overall notices in the data set) and any problems with their notices can
affect the overall conclusions. 105 We paid special attention, therefore,
to issues with notices from those top senders. The American
Poolplayers Association, which sent 21 notices, had a significant
effect on the number of notices with questions about the
copyrightability of the complained-of material. (APA's 21 notices
comprise 57% of the 37 notices that presented obvious questions of
copyrightability. See infra Sec. VI.F.) Microsoft's 21 notices all
related to circumvention of software, of which 20 were § 512(c)
notices, and one was apparently to a § 512(a) subscriber. 10 6
102. Notice #954, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=954 (dated Nov.
11,2003).
103. Although we have some idea of how many notices for which each repeat sender is
responsible, we may not have captured all notices for each sender because senders may send
under alternative or variant names. For instance, the Avatar / Star's Edge notices are listed under
both names.
104. The top five senders in the database range widely. American Poolplayers Association
and Microsoft Corp. sent 21 notices, and Articlelnsider.com/Infosearch sent 23 notices. Mir
Internet Marketing sent 50 notices and Star's Edge, International/Avatar sent 54 notices.
105. We did not engage in detailed statistical manipulation to attempt to isolate the level of
effect that repeat senders had on the overall results. We made this decision first, because our
goal in this paper is to obtain a snapshot of the § 512 process, and the fact that repeat senders
send flawed notices is a useful part of that information. Second, because the present data are
limited in the other ways described above, we would rather look at any repeat sender effect in
more detail with a more broadly applicable data set. To this end, we hope that data from The
Planet will be useful.
106. This notice was unpublished for reasons unrelated to its content. Though the vast
majority of the notices that comprise our dataset are publicly available on the Chilling Effects
website, a few notices are on file in the nonpublic database. Note that, throughout the Article,
we generally cite notices illustratively, rather than comprehensively. Where there are three or
fewer notices in a particular category we cite them all.
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Articlelnsider/Infosearch sent 23 notices, 7.2% of the literary
properties in the§ 512(d) set. Mir Internet Marketing's 50 notices
almost entirely (48) related obviously to competitors. Star's
Edge/Avatar's 54 notices were not counted as fair uses as a per se
rule, but were not excluded from the count if something specific to
the notice warranted its inclusion.
4. DMCA Enforcement Companies, Agents, Proxies &
Rightsholders
We were interested in who executes the § 512 process for
complainants, given the existence of private "rights enforcement"
companies. The vast majority of all § 512(c) and (d) notices in our
data set were sent by the rightsholders themselves, or their attorneys;
far fewer notices were sent by agents, proxies or trade associations.
Of § 512(c) notices, 94% were sent by or on behalf of the
rightsholders directly. Of § 512(d) notices, 98.5% were sent by or on
behalf of the rightsholders directly. 107 Agents, enforcement agencies,
and trade associations combined only account for 4.9% of all § 512(c)
notices, and only 1.3% of § 512(d) notices. 108 The picture is much
more diverse in our § 512(a) notices, where rightsholders sent 29% of
the notices; enforcement companies sent 26.1% of the notices; and
trade associations sent 30.4% of the 69 § 512(a) notices. 109 Of
§ 512(a) notices sent on behalf of the large entertainment
corporations, 18 notices were sent by DMCA enforcement companies,
prominently including BayTSP, GrayZone and MediaForce. 10
Trade associations also show up as senders among our data,
although they are a clear minority of users of the process. In total, 36
notices were sent by trade associations. Of the trade association
notices, most represented corporate interests, such as the Business
Software Association; only three represented individual interests,
such as the Science Fiction Writers Association and the Creators
107. To the extent that the rightsholders are individuals, this is a testament to the ease and
simplicity of the process. However, "rightsholder" encompasses any rightsholder, whether
corporate, nonprofit, or individual.
108. A small number of notices in each category could not be classified as to their relation
to the rightsholder. For instance, T-Mobile sent a notice on behalf of celebrity customer, Paris
Hilton, regarding her T-Mobile address book which was apparently hacked. See notice # 1761,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD = 1761 (dated Mar. 15, 2005).
109. The remainder, 10 notices (14.5%), were unclassifiable.
110. See Sonia Katyal, Privacy Vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 222 (2004-05), and The
New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297 (2003) (discussing the privacy and
surveillance concerns that arise from these enforcement agencies).
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Syndicate."' We note that the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) have only 9 notices in the § 512(c)-(d) sections, and that, to
the extent that they used copyright enforcement agents such as
MediaForce, they may appear under-represented. 112 Only three
notices were sent by traditional literary or licensing agents. In a few
instances, celebrities or models' agencies and publishers collaborated
to send notices. 113
C. Target Characteristics
Examining the characteristics of the targets of the notices-the
alleged infringers-we found that 41% of all Google notice targets
can be classed as competitors of the complainants. Fig. 6. This is
particularly significant for Google § 512(d) complaints regarding
links in the index, where 55% of all notices relate to competitors. A
significant percentage of the § 512(c) and (d) notices sent to
Google-2 1%-target hobbyists, critics and educational users.
The "hobbyists" category includes many bloggers and fan sites.
Notices sent to hobbyists are often from rival hobbyists or businesses
in the field. Unauthorized use of photographs or graphics is a
common theme in these notices, especially in the blog-related
notices.1 14 The blogs may or may not be directly related to the topic
of the copyrighted work; a use may be simply an illustration, linked to
111. Notice # 374, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=374 (dated July
29, 2002); notice # 402, http://chillingeffects.orgldmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=402 (dated
Sept. 6, 2002); and notice # 408, http://chillingeffects.org/dmcaSl2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=408
(dated Sept. 9, 2002).
112. We classed notices sent by trade associations as either "corporate" or "individual"
senders based on their constituent members. We classed the Science Fiction Writers
Association (SFWA) and the Creators Syndicate as "individual" senders because the
associations primarily represent individual creators. We categorized other associations as
"corporate" senders because they represent primarily corporate rightsholders. The "corporate"
senders include the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA), Business
Software Association (BSA), and Entertainment Software Association (ESA).
113. See, e.g., notice # 1626, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1626
(dated Jan. I, 2005); notice # 1456,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1456 (dated Sept. 15, 2004).
114. See, e.g., notice #968, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=968
(dated Nov. 11, 2003) (photographs of the "Merry Pranksters" used on the "Cosmic Baseball
Association" website, a "baseball league of the imagination.").
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or grabbed from the Internet for its aesthetics rather than its original
significance. 115
Target Characteristics Google 512(c) vs. Google 512(d)
2 0
200-
150 4
100 -.
no competition small large hobbyist /
classified business corporation personal /
attributes fair use
Fig. 6. Characteristics of targets of§ 512(c) and (d) notices sent to
Google.
Comparison with the self-reported notices-including § 512(a)
notices-shows that notices sent about competition are far more
significant in the Google set than the self-reported set, and are
particularly significant for search index complaints. This is
unsurprising, given the fierce competition over search-result rank in
Google's index. The hobbyists, critics and educational uses are higher
in the self-reported set, also perhaps unsurprising given the self-
selecting nature of that set. Fig. 7.
[i512(c)
115. See, e.g., notice # 2189, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=2189
(dated July 28, 2005) (takedown notice regarding a photo of a poodle, used by a blogger to
illustrate an original poem); notice # 1287,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1287 (dated May 14, 2004) (a blog for
Columbia students apparently linked to a graphic on the complainant's website).
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Target Characteristics (Google vs. non-Google OSPs)
30 0 - .. ... ..... .... . .... .
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no competition small large hobbyist /
classified business corporation personal /
attributes fair use
Fig. 7. Characteristics of targets of§ 512 notices.
D. Recipient OSP Characteristics
The data set of self-submitted notices is too small to afford any
real quantitative analysis of recipient OSP characteristics. However,
we do note that the notices represent many different kinds of OSPs.ll 6
A wide variety of hosting providers are represented, including blog
hosts (LiveJournal and Blogger, a Google subsidiary), and UseNet
hosts (Google Groups submits posts). 1 17 Section 512(a)-type hosts
include many broadband providers of both DSL and cable access1 1 8
We also have at least one notice to an upstream host of a webhost. 119
116. See supra note 85, discussion of § 512(b).
117. One area of hosting services that we have yet to see significant notices for are the
social networking services-Friendster, Tribe, MySpace, etc. Although Google has an entry in
this marketplace, the Orkut (beta) service, its share in the social networking software market is
relatively small. In the dataset as a whole, only one § 512(c) notices pertain to social networking
software-neither of them for Google's Orkut. Notice # 2219, (note available upon request from
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.) (dated Aug. 4, 2005, sent to MySpace.com).
118. The layering of services presents a potentially wide choice of § 512(a), (c), and (d)
hosts for any given website. For instance, an individual who maintains a website may in fact
have several "Intemet Service Providers" in § 512(c) and § 512(a) capacities. The website may
be on a "shared host" environment; essentially, space on a machine that is leased to the website
owner. The lessor may in turn be a lessee of another company, and there can be several layers of
this kind of webhost. Each of these would be § 512(c) providers. Ultimately, the machine is
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E. Subject Matter: Characteristics of the Allegedly Infringing
Material
In this section, we delve into some more detailed characteristics
of the notices we observed. For descriptive purposes, we sorted
notices, and discuss them, according to loose subject matter
categories, such as "text,". "photographs" and "film." At some points,
we use more detailed descriptors, such as "literary property."
Although these categories can be, we think, useful in sketching a
picture of the notices as a group, they are mainly descriptive, and we
recognize that others may have sorted some notices differently.
1. 512(c) (Hosted Material) Notices.
Out of all § 512(c) notices in either the Google or self-reported
sets (303 in total), 10 relate to movies; 120 7 to music; 12 1 7 to
games; 122 63 to software123; 37 to photos; 124 8 to other graphics; 125
166 to text;126 5 relate to whole websites; 127 and 4 were
undefinable. 128
Looking at the seven § 512(c) notices sent in reference to music
more closely, we first note that all seven were self-submitted notices.
Three of the seven requested takedown of music files being offered
for download-one Faith Hill promotional song, another notice
requesting takedown of multiple Faith Hill songs, and a third notice
requesting takedown of some 88 songs by Ten Thousand Fists. 129 The
other notices were a grab-bag. One notice was a complaint about
music files offered, but listed the number of such files available as
owned and perhaps managed by another webhost, also a § 512(c) provider. That provider
receives Internet access from a § 512(a) provider. If the website manager provides a bulletin
board or other interactive service on the website, then the website manager may also act as a
§ 512(c) provider. If the website manager also maintains a search engine, then the website
manager may also qualify as a § 512(d) provider.
119. Notice # 500, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=500 (dated Dec.
3, 2002) (Dow Chemical to Verio, the upstream Internet provider for the Yes Men's webhost).
120. 3.3%; 2 Google, 8 non-Google.
121. 2.3%; all 7 are non-Google.
122. 2.3%; 2 Google, 5 non-Google.
123. 20.8%; 60 Google, 3 non-Google.
124. 12.2%; 22 Google; 15 non-Google.
125. 2.6%; 5 Google, 3 non-Google.
126. 54.8%; 142 Google, 24 non-Google.
127. 1.7%; 2 Google, 3 non-Google.
128. 1.3%; 2 Google, 2 non-Google. Note that these percentages do not quite add up to
100%, because four notices listed multiple types of content.
129. Notices # 2102, 2113, 2246 (notices available upon request from SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.) respectively.
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"0.''130 One notice requested takedown of guitar tabs, which are
arguably fair uses; however, taking a fairly conservative approach, we
did not code them as such. 131 Two relate to celebrated cases of
mashups or other claims of infringement of the derivative-works
right: the Grey Album, 132 or Beatallica. 133 This is obviously far too
small a sample to be statistically relevant, and almost certainly
reflects selection bias relating to media coverage of the relevant
subject matter. Increased media coverage may cause more people to
download, and to host, the allegedly infringing material, both
attracting cease-and-desist letters and also making it more likely that
those letters will be submitted to Chilling Effects. For example, the
Grey Album was the subject of a concerted "civil disobedience" day,
which encouraged users to download and host the work, a mash-up of
The Beatles' White Album and JayZ's Black Album.134 (Similarly,
there was a concerted effort aimed at distributing and hosting the
Diebold memos, a set of internal memos revealing practices that may
have affected electronic voting machines. 135)
Of the ten § 512(c) notices sent by companies in the film
industry, only two were sent to Google; the other eight were sent to
other ISPs, and were included in the self-reported § 512(c) set. Of the
130. Notice # 646, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=646 (dated May
8, 2003).
131. Notice # 170, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=170. The site
was removed when we examined it but the original annotator noted that the contents were guitar
tabs. Guitar tabs are often derived by a listener, and the entabulation process can result in
different tabs from user to user. Entabulation is thus somewhat akin to a transcription of the
music, but the transcriber has additionally made assessments about how the notes might best be
played on a guitar. (Thanks to Robert Clarida for explaining the entabulation process).
132. Notice # 858, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=858.
133. Notice # 856 (notice available upon request from author).
134. Grey Tuesday was Feb. 23, 2004. See Grey Tuesday, http://www.greytuesday.org/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
135. One site chronicles the "electronic civil disobedience" story, and includes statements
from participating protesters, like the statement from Micah White, student, Swarthmore
College, on Oct. 29, 2003:
Diebold can't win! Each takedown request is simply met with more mirrors. We
are willing and able to continue this campaign until the 2004 presidential
elections.... We estimate that at least 30,000 people have downloaded the entire
collection of 13,000 memos directly from just three of the mirrors above. The
memos are on peer-to-peer file trading systems. They are in Freenet.
Why War?, Targeting Diebold with Electronic Civil Disobedience, http://www.why-
war.com/features/2003/10/diebold.html. See also Free Culture Swarthmore, History,
http://scdc.sccs.swarthmore.edu/history.html.
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two Google notices, one was a movie script, 136 and the other cited
trademark and copyright complaints about a Google blog, but without
specifying any particular copyrighted or infringing works. 137 Of the
eight self-reported notices, we first note that two presented obvious
defenses: one was a complaint about a screenshot 138 and one was a
misguided complaint about a public domain film archived at the
Internet Archive. 139 Three of the ten notices complained of illegal
offerings of copyrighted content, all presumably popular TV
shows.' 4 0 Although two notices were likely related to DeCSS claims,
we did not include them in the anti-circumvention counts for lack of
adequate confirming information. 141 Finally, one notice was sent from
IO/Titan Media to Sharman, notifying it that P2P users were using
Sharman's software to distribute Titan's copyrighted films. 142
Obviously, the self-submitted notices constitute a grab-bag of issues,
and are likely not representative of all such § 512(c) notices.
As might be expected since the web is still heavily text-based in
its offerings, text was by far the most-represented subject matter in
the § 512(c) notices: 142 § 512(c) notices relating to text were sent to
Google, and 24 § 512(c) notices relating to text were sent to self-
reported OSPs and self-submitted by recipients. Of these notices, the
majority were not easily classifiable beyond "text"-98 notices total,
16 self-reported OSPs, 82 Google notices. The text notices that were
136. Arguably the movie script notice could have been counted as a text notice; we elected
to count it as a film-related notice because the sender was a motion picture company and the
work was a derivative of a filmic work. See notice # 1432,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1432 (Sept. 21, 2004).
137. Notice # 1882, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1882 (dated
Apr. 26, 2005).
138. Notice # 1139, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1139 (dated
Feb. 25, 2004).
139. Notice # 595, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=595 (Feb. 27,
2003).
140. Notice # 173, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=173 (dated Feb.
19, 2002); notice # 151, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgiNoticelD=151 (dated
Sept. 28, 2000); notice # 234, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=234
(dated Feb. 27, 2002) ("Presumably," because one of the notices listed only "such titles as...,"
rendering it unclear whether those titles were actually available for download or not. Notice
#234).
141. Notice #156, unpublished, but mentioning DeCSS, and notice # 1228 (notice available
upon request from SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.), in which the MPAA
complained of downloads of two computer programs, "DVD Streamer" and "Flashdust," both of
which permit streaming of DVDs.
142. Notice # 1051 (notice available upon request from SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J.). This notice cited both § 512(c) and (d). We note that it is an open question whether
Sharman qualifies as a § 512(c) provider, a § 512(d) provider, or neither.
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otherwise "unclassifiable" contained a mix of materials, or did not fit
into the major categories of texts we had otherwise identified. For
instance, we described the Diebold notices as unclassifiable text,
because they included e-mails, internal correspondence and other
materials. 143 The Avatar/Star's Edge "lecture" materials were often
included in "text," as were the Scientologist materials, a political site
parodying the New York Times, 144  and many others. Many
"unclassifiable text" notices included text from websites. Of the
"text" notices from which we could obtain more information, 21
related to systems or methods; 6 were obviously noncopyrightable
data; 5 were e-mails posted by the recipient. Twenty-eight notices (or
16.8%) were related to traditional literary texts-18 articles, 7 stories
and 3 books. Of the "literary texts," we note that a number of these
texts were redistributions of religious, spiritual or Scientology-like
materials, including the Avatar notices. 145 Four notices resulted from
the author's reconsideration of the publication of the original
article. 146
143. See, e.g., notice # 911, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=91 1;
and notice # 2372 (notice available upon request from SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J.).
144. Notice # 1178, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1178 (dated
Mar. 9, 2004).
145. See, e.g., notice # 335, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=335
(dated June 19, 2002) (Scientologists to Google requesting takedown from Google Groups of
"confidential, unpublished, copyrighted works ... comprising levels known as 'NOTs'); #352,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=352 (July 18, 2002) (Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints requesting takedown of "a series of six textual missionary
discussions" reprinted without authorization); notice # 574,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=574 (Feb. 18, 2003) (requesting
takedown from Google Groups of "The Vampire Bible"); notice # 650,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=650 (Apr. 24, 2003) (requesting
takedown from Google's cache of the "Ex-Premie" site the "complete texts to 14 complete
songs and an entire book" owned by the "Premics," aka "Elan Vital"); notice # 1226,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1226 (Feb. 5, 2004) (Evangelical
Christian tract publisher requests takedown of parody); notice # 1340,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1340 (July 21, 2004) (Religious
copyright owner requests takedown of material from critic's website). See also Theresa A.
Lyons, Scientology or Censorship: You Decide. An Examination of the Church of Scientology,
Its Recent Battles with Individual Internet Users and Service Providers, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, and the Implications for Free Speech on the Web, 2 RUTGERS J. OF L. &
RELIGION 1 (2000) (discussing the background of the Scientologist disputes, and expressing
concern that the DMCA will contribute to suppression of speech).
146. See, e.g., notice # 273, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=273
(dated Mar. 15, 2002); notice # 1725,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgiNoticelD=1725 (dated Feb. 16, 2005); notice #
1907, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1907 (dated May 5, 2005) (not
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Of the 37 photo-related § 512(c) notices, a small number (three)
were personal photos that the subject wanted removed. Two were
parents requesting takedown of photos of children, 147 and one was an
individual requesting takedown of photos of himself from a critical
website.148 Fifteen of the 37 photo-related § 512(c) notices were sent
to OSPs other than Google; these included at least four identifiably
pornography-related claims; seven from Leslie Kelly, plaintiff in
Kelly v. Arriba;149 three personal photographs; and a celebrity
photograph, possibly altered into pornography. Of the 22 photo-
related § 512(c) notices sent to Google, at least seven were
pornography-related claims, including some from Perfectl0. The
remainder included a variety of photographs, including professional,
artistic and non-commercial photographs. We note that the allegedly
infringing use of the works often seemed to incorporate the work into
a larger work, such as an illustration of an article or a commentary.
Further study on the derivative, transformative or substitutive use of
photographic works, and the mix of personal, nonprofit or
commercial uses, would be appropriate.
Of the 70 § 512(c) notices that were sent regarding software or
computer games, 53 notices (76%) obviously or likely targeted
anticircumvention devices rather than direct copyright infringement
of the code. We discuss issues related to anticircumvention notices
further below. Of the other claims included within the notices, nine
related to distributions of the program or game, five to apparent
published for other reasons). Two notices are § 512(c) and two notices cite both § 512(c) and
(d).).
147. See, e.g., notice # 2189, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2189
(dated July 28, 2005) ; notice # 2199,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2199 (dated July 29, 2005).
148. See notice # 954, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=954 (dated
Nov. 11, 2003). It is sometimes difficult to understand the history of the notices. In this instance,
the "critical" site used the photos to illustrate the blogger's critique of the individual, such as the
individual's habit of driving expensive cars. Depending on the underlying factual circumstances,
this kind of criticism might be construed as performing a useful service, or as a form of
harassment or defamation. However, the § 512 process creates a simple action for enforcing
copyrights only, not torts. Any balancing of speech and privacy rights that might take place in a
judicial action between the speaker and the complainant are elided by this substitution of actions
on the part of the complainant. But see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting
Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REv. 335 (2005) for a proposal that a § 512 notice-and-takedown
regime be implemented for speech-related torts, replacing Section 230. While Rustad and
Koenig acknowledge that § 512 has had speech-chilling effects, they suggest that a tort-version
could have sufficient procedural protections to avoid the problem.
149. Kelly v. Arriba, 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Leslie Kelly has filed multiple
takedown notices against sites that have used his photographs. See Chilling Effects at
http://www.chillingeffects.org.
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resales and three to distributions of the source code. We have
surprisingly few notices related to so-called "warez" sites-only
12.9% (nine notices) related to distributions of software, games or
code. This may be an artifact of our data, which has few notices to
small webhosts; perhaps our review of the notices from The Planet,
which provides webhosting, will show a different picture.
2. 512(d) (Information Location Tools) Notices
The § 512(d) set showed roughly similar composition of subject
matter to the § 512(c) notices, with significantly more takedown
requests complaining of links to text than any other kind of subject
matter-329 of 521 notices 150 (63.1%) asked for removal of links to
text materials-unsurprisingly, mostly web-related content, as we
discuss below.
Movie industry companies sent only 12 of the § 512(d) notices,
and music industry companies sent only two. The software and games
industries sent 56 § 512(d) notices requesting removal of links. Of the
56 total § 512(d) notices relating to software or computer games, 46%
(26 notices) presented anticircumvention claims, and 54% (30
notices) presented only non-anticircumvention claims. Compared
with § 512(c), more § 512(d) notices requested the removal of links
offering downloads of works-48.3% of the software and game §
512(d) notices (28 notices). 151 Some of the notices presented multiple
claims, including complaints of reverse engineering, derivative works
or resales of software.
Notices related to photographs comprised 13% (68 notices) of
the § 512(d) notices, with other graphics at 4.6% (24 notices). As with
the § 512(c) notices, some of the § 512(d) notices (eight) described
what appeared to be personal photographs that the subject wanted de-
linked; in only two of these eight notices was it clear that the sender
understood that ownership of the copyright likely belongs to the
photographer rather than to the subject. 152 And again, as with the
150. Note that, if one takes each category of content (text, movies, music, etc.) separately,
one will find that the percentages do not add up to 100% because some notices included
multiple claims relating to different kinds of subject matter.
151. In most of these notices, the presence of the downloadable files could not be verified,
presumably because the files or posting had been taken down.
152. Notice # 1763, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5I2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1763 (dated
Mar. 21, 2005), states this more clearly, and possibly stated in notice # 1179,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1179 (dated Mar. 15, 2004). The other
notices included only the formal language of the DMCA, or other information not relating to the
copyright ownership issues. See, e.g., notice #s 1092, 1207, 1233, 1234, 1235, and 1242
(available by visiting http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD= followed by the
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§ 512(c) photograph notices, a few of these eight § 512(d) photograph
notices presented obvious personal privacy issues. For example, one
complainant explicitly stated that "[t]he image on the above link has
my photo. I do not want people to search my name and see my photo.
I feel uncomfortable."' 153 The general composition of § 512(d)
photographic notices was largely similar to the § 512(c) set: a mix of
notices citing professional (including pornographic) works and
amateur works on a wide variety of topics.
Looking more closely at the 329 § 512(d) notices complaining of
links to text-based material, 50.5% (166) of the 329 notices cited web
copy of some sort-some portion of a website, but not the entire
website. 154 Thirty-eight (11.6%) § 512(d) "text" notices complained
of plain product descriptions. Reviews of individual notices show that
in a number of additional notices the complaint related more broadly
to descriptions of services or features-effectively, ad or brochure
copy. At least half a dozen notices claimed copyright over meta-
tags. 155 Over and beyond the numerous notices requesting takedown
of text-related webcopy, an additional 53 notices alleged copying of
an entire website, and requested removal of links to the entire site.
notice #). The DMCA only states that the complainant must attest that they are the copyright
owner or an authorized representative. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
153. Notice # 1233, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5-12/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1233 (dated
Apr. 16, 2004).
154. In addition to these text-based notices that alleged copying of a portion of a website,
an additional 53 claimed copying of an entire website. Because an entire website might include
a variety of media or programming, we did not count those 53 notices in "text," but elected to
count them separately. The distinction between an accusation of copying an entire website and
copying some other lesser portion of a website is meaningful but difficult to ascertain from just
a complaint-and difficult to determine even with significant review of the websites. Certainly,
copying an entire site without permission is highly suggestive of, if not presumptively,
infringement; whereas, copying lesser portions of a site might well be protected if those portions
are factual in nature, de minimis, or used transformatively, for instance. These distinctions were
made to the best of our ability, but it was difficult to determine with many of these notices how
much of the website was alleged to have been copied. Complainant often used language
suggestive of significant copying, but reviews of the sites rarely turned up exact mirror images.
For our purposes, we counted any notice that alleged "mirroring," the "whole website," or
similar terminology as a complaint about the entire website, even though we recognized that
reliance on the complainant's description could result in over- or under-inclusiveness on this
metric. We counted all other web-text related complaints as web copy-which could vary from
just a tiny amount of text, to a large portion of the website, or an entire section of a website.
155. See, e.g., notice # 2225 (notice available upon request from SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J.); notice # 2032,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID2032 (dated June 9, 2005). Metatags are
not copyrightable, although they may include trademarks. Many notices used more generic
language than "metatags," claiming keyword tagging or other related concepts. Most such
complaints also included complaints about infringement of other website content, such as
layout, CSS, HTML, or content.
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This area begs study, as there is little caselaw delineating what
aspects of a website are copyrightable expression and what are
functional, ideas, or otherwise not protectable.
Of the 329 § 512(d) notices targeting text materials, 70 (21.2%)
were based on literary properties of various sorts, including four
notices citing books and 66 citing "articles" or "stories" (including
blog postings). 156 The infringement claims here seemed strong.
Dissemination of short text articles in their entirety seems likely to be
infringing and not a fair use, should such a complaint be litigated. 157
Likewise, disseminations of entire short stories or poems seem likely
to constitute infringement.
As with notices targeting photographs, some of the § 512(d)
notices targeting text described various personal privacy or dignity
concerns. Seven notices related to private e-mails posted publicly.158
At least 18 notices expressed a wish to de-index content because of
embarrassment over the text.159 A few complainants expressed
unhappiness over the circumstances of the current publication, rather
than the publication per se. 160
3. Section 512(a) (ISP) Notices
We stress that our set of § 512(a) notices is statistically
unreliable. There are only 68 such notices, and all were self-
submitted. Nevertheless, we include this section to complete the
156. See, e.g., notice # 641, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=641
(dated Apr. 21, 2003) (short story "Pomucopia" posted to Google Groups).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The primary variation would be in the first factor, the "purpose and
character of the use." If the full-text of an article is posted on a website with no additional
commentary or other transformative features, then the effect on the market for the original
article is likely to hinge on the circumstances surrounding the website, such as whether it is
accessible or publicized to the world or just a small set of, for instance, educational users or
organizational members.
158. See, e.g., notice #1220, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1220
(dated Mar. 26, 2004) (requesting takedown of a transcript of a private chat).
159. See, e.g. notice #892, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=892
(dated Oct. 4, 2003); notice # 312, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=312
(dated May 7, 2002) (one of a series of related notices). There were at least twenty notices
making such claims in the dataset; sixteen were § 512(d) notices; two were § 512(c); and two
were both § 512(c) and (d). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., notice # 611, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID61 I
(dated Mar. 20, 2003) (the author of an article was unhappy that a Holocaust denier was
republishing the author's work); #671,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=671 (dated May 12, 2002) (the author of
a poem requested takedown of a notice that reposted the poem in a way that the author felt
"defames myself and my reputation"; the e-mail "included derogatory comments about the
author.").
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picture of subject matter sent under the various sections in our data
set.
As previously discussed, the movie industry sent the majority of
these notices: 45 notices (66%). These were most typically form
notices alleging peer-to-peer file sharing of commercially copyrighted
films from major studios, 161 although a few were apparently
pornography. 162 Nine notices made software-related claims, typically
sent by BayTSP (a DMCA enforcement company) or the Business
Software Association (BSA). 163 Six notices were computer game-
related, all sent by either the Interactive Digital Software Association
(IDSA) or the Entertainment Software Association (ESA). 164 Only
four notices were from the music industry.165 The remaining notices
were unclassifiable or multimedia, including one audiorecording of a
book.166
F. Enforceability, Substantive Legal Flaws and Process-
Related Concerns
Perhaps most striking, we found that at least a third of notices
contain at least one of the major categories of flaws we evaluated.
These categories pose significant questions about the claim's
enforceability in a court of law and/or invite serious concerns about
the fairness of the process for targets. They are:
* substantive legal questions related to the underlying copyright
claim; and
* significant technical noncompliance that renders the notice
unusable according to the statute.
This figure does not include other questionable uses of the § 512
takedown process, such as sending notices where § 512(a) would
apply, complaining of anticircumvention information, 167 or sending
161. See, e.g., notice # 1349, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID-1349
(dated Aug. 2, 2004) (Cox forwarding to their customer a BayTSP notice on behalf of
Paramount, alleging sharing of "Star Trek Nemesis.").
162. See, e.g., notice # 857, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=857
(dated Sept. 8, 2003).
163. See, e.g., notice # 713, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=713
(dated July 17, 2003).
164. See, e.g., notice # 1366, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1366
(dated Apr. 28, 2004).
165. See, e.g., notice # 1489, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1489
(dated Nov. 15, 2004).
166. Harry Potter, of course. Notice # 532,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=532 (dated Jan. 23, 2003).
167. See supra note 98 and infra Sec VI.F.6. for discussion of this issue.
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notices when complicated questions of international law are relevant.
We also did not count some categories of notices that are arguably
fair use or otherwise defensible, as described in Section V,
Methodology, above. In this section, we describe the notices that
comprise the "flawed one-third," as well as some other perhaps-
problematic notices that we discovered but did not include in the
count.
1. Issues with Underlying Copyright Claim.
We first examined significant questions related to the underlying
copyright claim, including fair use defenses, other substantive
defenses, very thin copyright, or non-copyrightable subject matter.
Fig. 8. Surprisingly, 31% of § 512(c) and (d) notices present claims
that fall into this category. 168 As a rule of thumb, we tried to capture
notices where a genuine dispute related to copyright infringement or
defenses would clearly arise. Examples range from the clearly
problematic-for example, recipes, prices and metatag information,
which are unlikely to be covered by copyright-to instances of very
thin copyright claims, such as very short product descriptions. We
also included notices where the target was likely to have a fair use
defense. A much smaller number of notices in this category were
counted due to other substantive concerns, such as questions
regarding the ownership of the copyright in question: for example, a
small number of notices appear to be sent not by the copyright holder
or a representative, but by a party with some other interest in the
material, such as the subject of a photograph. Among § 512(c)-(d)
notices sent to Google, at least one type of substantive, subject-matter
flaw was apparent in 209 notices, or 29% of the Google set. Among
the self-reported § 512(c)-(d) notices, 43 (59 %) of the self-reported
notices had at least one substantive flaw.
168. Notices often present multiple claims, describing multiple works, multiple alleged
infringements, and often multiple target sites. Such notices might present a mix of problematic
and non-problematic claims. For our analysis, we counted notices with at least one problematic
claim. Any notice is only counted once-i.e., we do not count a notice again if it has multiple
problematic claims.
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Notices by Type of Flaw (Google and Non-Google)
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Fig. 8. Significantly flawed§ 512(c)-(d) notices.
One issue present in the § 512(c) and § 512(d) notice datasets is
the problem of noncopyrightable subject matter. A total of 37 notices
include claims for noncopyrightable subject matter, such as
recipes, 169 pricing information, 170 forms 17 1 and methods.1 72 The
American Poolplayers Association sent takedown notices for posting
169. See, e.g., notice # 1327, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1327
(dated June 24, 2004). While the text and photos surrounding a recipe can be copyrighted, the
instructions and ingredients of the recipe cannot. See 37 CFR § 202.1(a) (listings of ingredients
are not copyrightable) and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (procedures and processes are not copyrightable);
see also Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (no copyright for
recipes from a compilation cookbook). But see Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (recipes included significant commentary and creative description which precluded
summary judgment as to noncopyrightability of recipes).
170. See, e.g., notice # 960, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=960
(dated Nov. 17, 2003). Assignment of prices for sale of an item are likely not copyrightable, as
they are basic factual information. However, pricing information is not per se uncopyrightable.
Estimates that involve calculations, formulas and algorithms are more creative. For example,
determination of average prices for a consumer pricing guidebook involves creative
calculations, and may produce copyrightable information. See, e.g., CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197
F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
171. See, e.g., notice # 2085, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2085
(dated June 23, 2005). Forms are not subject to copyright. 37 CFR § 202.1; Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1880).
172. See, e.g., notice # 993, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgiNoticelD=993
(dated Dec. 3, 2003). "In no case does copyright protection.., extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .. " 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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its handicap formula. 173 (Formulas are specifically excepted from
copyright by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 174) Release of the handicap formula
may present other claims, such as trade secrecy, but the notices were
standard § 512 takedown notices, and made no additional allegations.
Further, the notices we reviewed did not directly copy the formula
from the manual, but instead described the formula, even
paraphrasing and adding commentary. Recipes are likewise exempted
from copyright as formulas or methods of operation. 175 Although
substantial literary expression in the form of surrounding text and
photographs may be copyrightable, the base recipe is not. Yet several
notices in the database claimed copyrights over recipes, and
demanded takedown of copies. 176 Pricing information is also largely
factual, yet complainants targeted the release of pricing and sales
information. 177
Questions of copyrightability were also raised by a variety of
takedown notices relating to factual material in databases, 178 product
descriptions and photographs, and forms and templates. For instance,
Yahoo! claimed a copyright on blog templates that emulate the
Yahoo! look-and-feel. 179 These templates were developed by blog
users for personal use and submitted by their user-developers to
Google's Blogger user template space. The copyrightable expression
in Yahoo!'s template and layout is likely to be thin indeed; it seems a
genuine dispute over infringement would arise. 180 Many of these
types of notices fall into a continuum of complaints that relate to
websites being spidered and used for other purposes. The targets may
be using the content for a variety of purposes: indexing product
173. Id. Most of the other notices related to reposts of the original post, along with
discussion of the putative intellectual property rights. See, e.g., notice # 1197,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgiNoticelD= 1197 (dated Feb. 18, 2004).
174. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 37 CFR § 201.1.
176. See, e.g., notice # 2207, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2207
(dated July 25, 2005).
177. See, e.g., notice # 952, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=952
(dated Nov. 14, 2003) (from Best Buy).
178. See, e.g., notice # 1260, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1260
(dated May 4, 2004) (real estate database).
179. See notice # 2085, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2085 (June
23, 2005).
180. Yahoo! also alleged trademark claims.
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information, as in Google's Froogle service; 181 generating search
engine hits for "link farms"; referencing competitor's products; or
emulating a competitor's website. While some such claims may be
very sympathetic, such as complaints about URLs being used in a so-
called link farm, they skirt the boundary of copyright protection. 182
But the § 512 process admits no such gray areas; takedown removes
any work alleged to infringe, regardless of the nature of the
infringement.
Product information constitutes another problematic area for
copyrightability. In complaints about product information, the
copyrighted work may consist of a factual description of a product,
accompanied by a very basic, "factual" photograph of the product.
While there is no question that such product information in
advertising can rise to high levels of artistry, 183 few of the product
information notices we reviewed demonstrated much originality.
Rather, the product descriptions were often short and descriptive.
Similarly, product photographs did not display any particular
attention to lighting, background, angle, etc.; rather, they simply
showed the described object. 184 While the level of originality required
for copyright protection is a mere quantum, at the least, it is likely to
be difficult to distinguish between noncopyrightable facts and the
copyrightable expression in short, factual, textual product descriptions
and representative, non-artistic product photos. 185 As such, we think
181. See, e.g., notice # 1265, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1265
(Apr. 23, 2004).
182. The merger doctrine holds that where the noncopyrightable idea and the copyrightable
expression are inseparably merged, no copyright may be accorded to the work. See Morrissey v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (lst Cir. 1967) (merger doctrine prohibits copyright of
lottery instructions); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (no copyright of an accounting form).
183. See the annual Clio advertising awards, http://www.clioawards.com (last visited Apr.
25, 2006).
184. Product photos indeed provide thin copyrightability, and a fine line for assessing
copyrightable expression and infringement. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763 (9th
Cir. 2003). Cf Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-4962, 2004 WL
2583817, *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) (examining photos of quilting patterns for creative
choices, including "the highlighting of certain colors and the muting of others; an extra
emphasis on a pattern's texture; and the heightened visibility of stitching in certain of the quilt
photographs.... Even though Plaintiffs' copyrights in their photographs may be 'thin,' they are
robust enough to offer protection here.").
185. We observed some related complaints regarding press releases describing services
offered by companies. Press releases-especially creative ones-are probably generally less
factual and more imaginative than mere product descriptions. However, claims of infringement
of language in press releases, or compilations of listings, were sometimes confusingly
intertwined with claims about titles, trademarks, meta-tags, and the like. The District Court in
the District of Columbia just disposed of one such case, finding that the plaintiff had significant
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that such notices require review before takedown, and counted them
as problematic based on the very thin copyright claim, and the strong
fair use claim that use of such thinly-copyrighted works often
presented. 186 These notices probably represent our least conservative
coding practice; yet, we were careful to count only those where the
copyright was thin, indeed, and expect that we undercounted them
due to lack of detailed information in many notices. 187
Similar issues plague the large number of notices claiming
infringement of website "layout" or design. Following our policy of
conservatively coding notices for problems, we elected not to include
this category of notices in our count of substantively flawed notices,
because they present too many analytic challenges. Each such claim
should be separately analyzed to determine its validity. In instances
where an entire site is 'mirrored' or copied, it is certainly likely that
copyright infringement is occurring. However, some cursory
examination of these claims reveals that some claims are not so
strong, and may in fact be considerably weaker. Our brief analysis
suggests that at least in some instances, the underlying copyright is
again, thin, resting on, for instance, the hierarchical scheme of laying
out pages of content; but we do not have enough information about
many of these notices to place them in the "flawed" category.188 We
do note that if a large proportion of the "website layout" claims rest
problems stating a claim. Terry Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 2005)
(dismissing plaintiffs' copyright, DMCA, and trademark claims for failure to state a claim).
186. For instance, Google's Froogle, which indexes product information, has received
notices requesting material be de-listed. See, e.g., notice # 1265,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1265 (dated Apr. 23, 2004). While
Google complies with such requests even absent DMCA takedowns, indexing such material is
likely a fair use. All the factors from Kelly v. Arriba would apply, but in addition, the copyright
on the underlying work is thinner for product photos than for artistic photos, and there is little or
no market for the original product photos and descriptions. Kelly v. Arriba, 280 F.3d 934 (9th
Cir. 2002).
187. See, e.g., notices # 1924 2021 and 2027 (available by visiting
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD= followed by the notice #). Here we
examine only the level of copyrightable content in the product descriptions and photos included
in the Chilling Effects database. However, these product description notices may raise other
issues as well. These notices are often competitor-related notices, where one reseller describes a
product and/or takes a photo of the product, and a second reseller uses that product information
in their own marketing materials. The original reseller's product information may also be based
on product information from the manufacturer. See, e.g., notice # 1473,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD= 1473 (dated Oct. 9, 2004).
188. It is difficult to assess a claim which consists entirely of several categories of thinly
copyrightable content, such as website layout; meta-tags; and database scrapings of product
descriptions. The strength of the copyright claim would be increased by the use of these
elements in aggregation, but unfair competition might be a more accurate description of the
grievance than "copyright infringement."
672 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.i. [Vol. 22
on thin (or vanishing) copyright, this would be of particular concern,
because many of these notices appear to be related to competitors
seeking to de-list their competitors in the Google search engine.
2. Other Defenses
A small number of notices presented various other defenses. For
instance, a small number of claims present obvious questions of
ownership. In at least seven notices, for instance, the apparent subject,
or parent of the subject, of a photograph wrote to request that the
photograph be removed from the Internet. While the § 512 formalities
were observed-the sender attests that they are the copyright owner
or a representative-on reading the notice, it seems likely that the
sender has misapprehended copyright law, and does not understand
that the photographer is the likely copyright owner.
Two notices presented a different ownership question: software
designers claimed that their client had failed to pay for a website
design, and that they therefore owned the copyright. 189 To even begin
to evaluate the validity of such a claim would require analysis of the
contract between the software designers and their clients, a task
clearly unsuited for search engines and webhosts. 190  These
ownership-related issues between Web contractors and their clients
also included a complaint that a former client had altered the website
design by removing information about the website designer-the
legality of which was centrally dependent on resolution of the
ownership question. 191 Another ownership-related dispute relied on a
189. See notice #1256, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1256 (dated
May 2, 2004); notice # 477, http://chillingeffects.orgldmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=477 (dated
Nov. 12, 2002).
190. Indeed, in a case with a similar dispute between a website designer and its former
employer, the court determined that the work was likely a work-for-hire, and the contract did not
condition transfer of ownership on full payment. IXL Inc. v. AdOutlet.com, Inc., No. 01 C 0763,
2001 WL 315219 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 29, 2001). Disputes between parties to a contract pose
questions that no OSP is in a position to evaluate, even if there were an incentive for the OSP to
do so. The process can become quickly complex; both of the parties have recourse to the quick
and easy extrajudicial proceedings of the § 512 takedown process. In Relate LLC v. Jones,
another dispute over ownership, one party had to be enjoined from sending takedown notices to
the other party's ISP. Both parties had apparently sent notices. Relate LLC v. Jones, No. 05-
0176-CV-W-FJG, 2005 WL 1936337 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 8,2005).
191. See notice # 1256, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1256
(dated May 2, 2004). The sender, a website design company, complained that the target had not
paid for the website and had altered it without permission. The senders claimed they did not
"release the copyright from the design portion of these websites." Aside from the ownership
dispute, the underlying copyright claim is itself quite complex, and would require separating the
design elements from the text, and then assessing whether removal of the designer's information
constituted a derivative work. Section 1202 of the DMCA, removal of copyright management
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client's complaint that a former web-designer had maintained a copy
of the website, which was achieving higher search rankings than the
client's. 192 Yet another notice claimed ownership over a work in the
public domain. 193 One notice was sent as part of an ongoing dispute
among at least three different parties, all of whom claim ownership
over a single work known as the "Footprints" poem. 194 These vexing
issues are also reflected in the limited available caselaw. In Relate v.
Jones, an ownership dispute that apparently involved multiple cross-
notices between the parties. One party ultimately obtained an
injunction barring the other from filing DMCA notices with his
ISP.195 Ownership of a copyright is handled, in the § 512 process,
with a simple attestation of ownership. Yet these examples suggest
that ownership of copyright-the threshold question before any claim
can be made-is readily misunderstood.
One sender sent two claims, seeking to remove blogs that linked
to allegedly copyright infringing materials-tertiary linking. 196
Linking to material merely alleged to infringe 17 USC § 106 is
unlikely to be deemed even contributory infringement. 197
Responsibility for hosting or indexing a site which links to a site that
information may also constitute a separate claim, but (properly) no such claim was stated in the
notice. 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
192. See notice # 373, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=373 (dated
Aug. 2, 2002).
193. See notice #595, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=595 (dated
Feb. 27, 2003). Such errors are likely when copyright holders attempt to automate the process of
locating copyright infringement, by sending notices in bulk in reliance on automatic searches of
keywords or filenames. See Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws
to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603 (2005)
(describing the hot processes used to automatically locating potentially infringing files).
194. Notice # 1531, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgiNoticeID-1531 (dated
Nov. 12, 2004). The work is "Footprints," a religious poem that has been frequently printed and
widely distributed with various attributions. The notice by itself puts forth a sympathetic case. A
recipient OSP or target would have to research the facts and history of the notice to realize that
authorship of the poem is disputed among multiple parties, and then determine how to respond
to the notice.
195. Relate LLC v. Jones, 2005 WL 1936337. See also IXL Inc. v. AdOutlet.com, Inc., No.
01 C 0763, 2001 WL 315219 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 29, 2001).
196. Notice # 2038, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2038 (dated
June 13, 2005); notice # 1944, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1944
(dated May 9, 2005). We note that in these notices, the complainant was not a US national, and
may not have been familiar with the nuances of US copyright law on liability for linking. See
also notice #548 (available upon request from the author) (Scientologists complain to a website
for mirroring Operation Clambake's site, but all the content is actually on Operation Clambake).
197. Tertiary linking was considered a form of "distribution" of a § 1201 circumvention
tool in Corley, but that is distinct from the § 106 exclusive right of distribution. Univeral City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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contains allegedly copyright infringing material seems clearly beyond
the scope of responsibility of § 512 OSPs.
3. Statutory Flaws
Significant statutory flaws plagued one out of every eleven
notices. Fig. 8, above. By "significant" statutory flaws, we mean one
of the four flaws that render a notice invalid according to the terms of
the statute: 198 failure to identify the allegedly-infringing work; failure
to identify the allegedly-infringed work; failure to provide a way to
locate the allegedly-infringing work; or failure to provide contact
information for the complainant. Other statutory flaws-the good
faith and penalty of perjury statements, and the signature--do not
exempt an OSP from responding to the notice, and notices exhibiting
these flaws are not included in this figure. Takedowns based on
notices with the significant flaws present significant burdens to the
recipient OSPs and questions of fairness to the target. A complaint
failing to identify the infringed or infringing works fails to make any
genuine showing of a controversy, however limited the review of the
merits of the controversy may be. Complaints that do not identify the
location of the allegedly infringing work may result in over- or under-
inclusive takedowns. The complainant contact information is
important because alleged infringers have no way to respond with a
counternotice if the OSP cannot reach the complainant.
4. Section 512(a) Notices
The non-Google data also show a high incidence of notices-
48%, nearly half-where OSPs are actually acting merely as conduits,
providing transmission and routing. At their most complete, the
notices in the Chilling Effects database include a copy of the original
complaint, accompanied by a warning or threat from the OSP to the
user. 199 The original complaint might include an "infringement
198. Section 512(c)(3)(A) sets forth the statutory requirements. Section 512(c)(3)(B)(ii)
specifies which clauses constitute "substantial compliance" and require some action by the OSP.
199. A number of notices were forwarded by OSPs without the original complaint. If no
additional information relating the complaint to copyright or particular copyright claims was
included, these notices were not included in the set of § 512(a) notices. If a so-called
"infringement report" was included without the original complaint, then we analyzed the notice
based on the OSP and alleged infringer content, and extrapolated the industry and corporate or
individual status based on the "infringement report". For instance, where a report listed an
obvious movie title or described the infringed work as a movie, we described the sender as
movie industry. We made one additional extrapolation to describe the complainant as
"corporate." In no instances did individual producers or directors send cease-and-desist notices;
in all instances the complainant was either the primary rights holder (the production company)
2006] EFFICIENT PROCESS OR "CHILLING EFFECTS"? 675
activity report" citing an IP address, a network protocol, and a file
alleged to have been distributed.200 Most complained-of material
appeared to reside on users' machines, made available via broadband
Internet access through a peer-to-peer network. 201 As noted supra,
transmission service falls under § 512(a), under which OSPs receive a
safe harbor without taking any material "down. '202 In fact, as the
material resides on user computers rather than OSP servers, there is
no way for the OSP to take material down, at all.203 We suspect that
the advent of P2P has pushed some of § 512's intended
beneficiaries-content providers-into sending notices where
or a DMCA enforcement agency. The infringement reports are quite standard and obviously
generated by particular DMCA enforcement agencies, but we chose to not extrapolate their
identities. The only notice that was not clearly identifiable as to industry was one for "Spider-
man" (sic). We ultimately determined that referred to a set of game "cheats" for the Spiderman
video game, after examining file types, and finding a discussion about that very notice in a chat
forum. All other notices clearly fell into particular content industries.
200. See, e.g., notice #1347, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1347
(dated July 31, 2004). One exception is the small number of notices sent to upstream Internet
access providers for webhosts. See, e.g., notice # 500,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=500 (dated Dec. 3, 2002) (Dow
Chemical's notice to Verio, upstream service provider for a political satire group, the Yes Men).
201. Of the § 512(a) notices in our data set, almost all are OSP notices to consumers, which
the consumer submitted to Chilling Effects. These consumer-submitted notices varied in what
communications they included. Some included only the notice from the OSP to the consumer;
some included only the notice from the complainant to the OSP; and some included both
communications from the complainant to the OSP, and from the OSP to the consumer. Some
submissions included additional correspondence or notes. Of the notices where a consumer
submitted only the OSP notice to the consumer, the basis of the original complaint was not
always apparent. For instance, the OSP might have cited only a "terms of service" violation,
without specifying copyright infringement or the DMCA. In examining the § 512(a) data set, we
only counted notices which included the original complaint, or where the OSP had included
sufficient information to tie the OSP notice to a copyright infringement claim. We included,
therefore, notices that stated that the complaint was for copyright infringement, cited § 512 or
"DMCA takedown notice," or where the OSP cited a content-owner and identifiable copyrighted
content.
202. One student commentator suggests that courts have had difficulty understanding what
services qualify as a § 512(a) OSP. Sven Eric Skillrud, An Umbrella or a Canopy?: Why the 17
U.S.C. Section 512(a) Safe Harbor Should Be Read Broadly, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv.
91 (Winter 2005).
203. See, e.g., In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) (Subpoena
Enforcement Matter):
Section 512(a) does not reference the notification provision of § 512(c)(3)(A),
nor does it contain the remove-or-disable-access provision found in the three safe
harbors created for the storage, caching, and linking functions of an ISP. The
absence of the remove-or-disable-access provision (and the concomitant
notification provision) makes sense where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for
infringing material-rather than directly storing, caching, or linking to infringing
material-because the ISP has no ability to remove the infringing material from
its system or disable access to the infringing material.
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§ 512(a) would apply. Notice in a § 512(a) context cannot result in
"takedown," but it can result in a record of alleged infringers about
whom multiple complaints are made. Given § 512's requirement that
OSPs develop and promulgate a policy for determining "repeat
infringers," it seems possible that those who send notices in a peer-to-
peer context are hoping to create a record that will convince OSPs to
terminate users who are the subject of complaints. Anecdotal
evidence of correspondence from OSPs to their users in our database
shows that some OSPs treat § 512(a) notices in this way.204
The notices in the Chilling Effects database do not, however,
uniformly include both OSP communications and complainant
communications, so it is difficult to determine what the standard of
the field is. A detailed survey of OSPs regarding their practices would
be helpful to better map practices in this area.
5. International Targets
One surprising result was the large number of notices targeting
material that appeared to reside outside the United States, particularly
for Google notices (253, or 34%, of the Google notices). Further, a
small number of notices (6) were sent to foreign OSPs. While the
underlying claim might be strong in the United States, foreign targets
may have local defenses; at the very least, foreign governments may
look askance at the ex ante takedown process of § 512. Of course,
foreign-owned material may be hosted on a United States ISP's
server, subject to United States laws. However, the vast majority of
these notices are related to Google search index results. For these
notices, the material may well reside offshore; Google merely
provides a link to the site. This Situation raises complex questions
related to U.S. jurisdiction over foreign actors who run afoul of
United States copyright laws-questions that OSPs are almost
certainly not in a position to answer when deciding whether to pull
material out of an index. 205
204. See, e.g., notice #834, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=834
(dated Sept. 8, 2003) ("[P]lease be advised that should Comcast receive further copyright
infringement complaints related to your Comcast Internet account, Comcast may terminate the
account....").
205. See Yen, supra note 16. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the
"Digital Millennium", 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 164 (1999) (discussing how this
situation can make it difficult to reach foreign infringers).
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6. Anti-Circumvention Notices
Finally, a number of notices-48 § 512(c) and 26 § 512(d)
notices-specifically request removal of apparent
"anticircumvention" devices, or links to anticircumvention devices,
under § 512. (An additional five notices did not specifically mention
anticircumvention devices, but were possibly targeting them.) We did
not add these notices to the count of "substantively flawed" notices.
We elected to treat them separately, as they target acts that are likely
illegal under § 1201. However, these anticircumvention takedown
notices are likely not proper subject matter for § 512 notices at all,20 6
and at the least they pose significant analytic difficulties under § 512.
Of the § 512(c) notices, 70 notices related to software or
computer games, and of those, 48 (68.6%) specifically requested
takedown of content based on an anticircumvention claim. Of the
remaining 22 notices, five represented possible anticircumvention
claims, including game "items" and game "cheats." Thus, of all
software and computer game § 512(c) notices, a total of 53 notices
(76%) were likely or definitely anticircumvention-related. The
anticircumvention claims cited terms such as "cracked copies," "serial
numbers or keys," "key generators" and other terms. We note that the
term "cracked copies" is vague, and could describe any number of
situations: a copy that has been reverse engineered to have the serial
number request removed, or to have a serial number embedded in the
software, or to have some other change made. Of the § 512(d) notices,
56 total notices presented software and games claims. Of those
notices, 26 (46.4%) presented anticircumvention claims, and 30
(53.6%) presented no apparent anticircumvention claims. Some of the
notices presented multiple kinds of claims, rendering analysis
complex; for instance, claims of distributing works, distributing
"hacked" works or various licensing violations (discussed below).
Many such notices are form notices that list multiple possible acts,
without specifying which is at issue in this instance. The acts may be
described vaguely and might specifically reference several acts
without specifying which is at issue, including distribution of reverse
engineered software, key generator software, software "cheats" or
serial numbers and access codes. 207
206. See supra note 98.
207. See, e.g., notice #1562, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD= 1562
(dated Dec. 21, 2004) ("[Tihe domain listed above.., is offering unlicensed copies of, or is
engaged in other unauthorized activities relating to copyrighted computer programs."). See
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7. Claims Other than Copyright
A number of notices (193) appear to include claims in addition
to, or instead of, copyright infringement-such as unfair competition,
trademark-type claims, or privacy concerns. In some instances, a
sender may have had a cognizable copyright claim, but they stated
concerns beyond or in addition to copyright infringement. For
example, as discussed in Section V.E, at least 26 notices reflect strong
concerns or details relating to privacy issues.
Licensing restrictions have also been raised by senders unhappy
with software resales. Three different senders sent a total of seven
cease-and-desist notices to request removal of offers to sell software.
Two of the notices sought to remove links to previously authorized
resellers. 208 The other five notices sought to remove links to offers to
sell copies of the works; while these may have been illegal copies, the
first two notices in the series explicitly reference the sender's "non-
transferable license" and state that only the sender or its "authorized
distributors or resellers" have the authority to "complete such license
transactions or distribute these products." 209 While some licensing
restrictions may map to copyright claims, some will not, and most are
likely to be enforced via contract law-an area of law not subject to §
512 takedown or safe harbor. Use of the takedown process to enforce
privately-determined rights is a significant expansion, and one that
elides the significant policy questions underlying shrink- and click-
wrap license enforcementl-questions which render an extrajudicial
takedown procedure particularly inappropriate. Requests to remove
notice #1378, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1378 (dated Aug. 4,
2004), regarding the offering a product key; notice #899,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=899 (dated Sept. 16, 2003) ("provides
access to data that directly violates license agreement and allows our intellectual property to be
used illegally ... provides access to illegal serial numbers, 'keygens', patches and copyrighted
materials.").
208. Notice # 1360, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1360 (dated
July 14, 2004) complains of an unauthorized reseller. Notice #813,
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=813 (dated July 24, 2003) claims that
their former reseller is illegally selling their software. This notice was sent from a Czech
software company regarding their Slovak reseller, adding international issues to the complexity
of the question.
209. Notices # 940, 1029, 1443, 1477, and 1637, dated from Nov. 3, 2003 to Jan. 17, 2005.
Notice #940 (dated Nov. 3, 2003) and 1029 (dated Dec. 22, 2003) reference the sender's "non-
transferable license" and state that only the sender and its "authorized distributors and resellers"
have the "authority to complete such license transactions or distribute these products." The other
three notices include only the required components of a § 512 notice. (Notices available by
visiting http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID= followed by the notice #).
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reverse engineered or adapted software may likewise rely partially or
entirely on restrictions imposed by license.
Because § 512 requires OSPs to develop a clear policy and
establish a takedown procedure, it seems that senders sometimes
shoehorn ill-fitting claims into a copyright complaint in order to
obtain relief, a use that is troubling. 210 Because of the small
percentage of notices that reflect any one of these concerns, they are
merely anecdotal, but again, add to the picture of how § 512 is being
used.
G. Lack of Counter Notification
A final observation: though the ex ante takedown of questionable
material would be troubling under any circumstances, concerns
(discussed infra Section VII) about the number of flaws revealed in
our data would be somewhat diminished if we had found evidence of
counternotices and putback. Only seven countemotices are included
in the Chilling Effects dataset, 211 and very few documented cases of
putback can be found.212 Confidential conversations with service
providers again suggest that our data reflect the overall experience of
OSPs, though we obviously cannot draw any conclusions based on
the limited notices we have. Here again, further research with OSPs is
needed. One possible reason for the low incidence of putbacks is that
it is easier for some alleged infringers to move material to another
hosting service or web site, rather than accept the 10-14 day
210. See Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116-19,
and note 67 (1990) (Judge Leval, recommending against using copyright to enforce privacy
rights, wrote:
Serious distortions will occur if we permit our copyright law to be twisted into
the service of privacy interests. First, it will destroy the delicate balance of
interests achieved under our privacy law. For example, the judgment that, in the
public interest, the privacy right should terminate at death would be overcome by
the additional fifty years tacked onto copyright protection.... Moreover, the
copyright law is grossly inappropriate to protect privacy and obviously was not
fashioned to do so.).
211. Notices # 360, 597, 605, 912, 1048, 1186, and 2371. (Notices available by visiting
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID- followed by the notice #) (notice 2371
available upon request from author).
212. See also MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL
FAIR USE SURVIVE? (2005), available at
http://fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf. This report followed up with notice
targets, and found that approximately half the targets took material down, regardless of the
strength of their claims. The Heins study reviewed all notices (including § 512 notices, but also
copyright, trademark and other notices) collected by the Chilling Effects website over the course
of one year, and followed up many notices in detail, providing rich anecdotal information about
the process.
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takedown. Further, our result may be an artifact of our data, which are
so dominated by search index notices. As a search provider has no
obligation under § 512 (and generally, no ability) to notify the alleged
infringer of takedown, there is little opportunity for targets to use the
countemotice process, at all. Google does provide hosting services,
and we have a substantial number of § 512(c) notices from it, but its
hosting services are relatively new, and constitute a minority of
notices from Google in our data set. Whether counternotices are more
common in other hosting situations is a question for further research.
Of the self-reported § 512(c) notices, relatively few users (only
ten) submitted correspondence from the OSP along with the original
notice, so there is little opportunity at present to assess whether OSPs
are informing their customers of the countemotice procedure. 213 We
note, however, that of the ten notices from § 512(c) providers to their
customers, four did not provide any information about the
counternotice option,214 four did,215 and two were ambiguous or
confusing. We have an additional 52 notices where a § 512(a)
provider forwarded information to its client.216 Many OSPs bolstered
the notices with threats based on the user's obligations from their
terms of service; 217 fewer than half (21) presented a § 512(c)-like
countemotice option. (We note, however, that of the six universities
that were among these OSPs, five proffered counternotice options).
213. We cannot assess from the user-submitted notices without OSP correspondence,
whether there was no correspondence from the OSP originally, or whether the user deleted it,
possibly because it had personal information or the user deemed it irrelevant.
214. See, e.g., notice # 2312, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=2312
(available upon request from the author) (AnotheRealm.com notice to customer, noting that they
saw nothing infringing, "[h]owever they are asking to have it removed, so please remove the
content and let us know when it is done." No information about countemotice procedures was
provided.).
215. See, e.g., notice # 950, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=950
(dated Nov. 13, 2003) (Blogger notice to client with information about counternotice options
and a link to a sample counter notice).
216. At least nine other notices in the database are plainly from § 512(a) OSPs to their
customers, but do not include any information from the OSP that could be evaluated.
217. Many large OSPs apparently have a standard counternotification notice in their
standard notice to users, but not all. We base this on observations of form language appended to
notices forwarded to users by Comcast, Cox, and AT&T, for example. We observe that the
current OSP practices may actually flirther intimidate users. Many notices include, with
information about the counternotice option, a warning that, by filing a counternotice, a target
"consents to be sued" in the complainant's jurisdiction. This is true, but this wording may make
litigation seem likelier than it is. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICiA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? (2005) (finding that, of targets who filed countemotices
or failed to comply with takedown notices, anecdotal reports of litigation or continued pursuit
were rare). Additionally, the correspondence we saw fails to explain that countemotices in good
faith will not increase legal liability nor increase the likelihood of a finding of liability.
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We expect that there is more to learn from our data set; further,
we look forward to investigations into broader data sets, data that
relate more closely to hosting services, and the like. Although more
research would clearly be useful, we found this data set very helpful
in developing a limited picture of § 512's use. We discuss our
findings and recommend changes in Section VII.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Concerns Revealed by the Data
Copyright infringement on the Internet is a serious issue-
distribution of valuable works can occur in a flash, and value may be
difficult to recapture-and the idea of a simple, inexpensive process
to handle takedowns is a beguiling one. But at what cost comes this
benefit? Our data reveal an unfortunately high incidence of
questionable uses of the process. Copyright analysis depends on the
particular facts and details of the situation. Even a sophisticated and
careful sender may send a notice with claims that should be reviewed
by a court before the target's material is removed. In many instances,
questionable uses may be unintended: deeper investigation of
individual notices reveals that some notice senders simply seem not to
understand the parameters of copyright law, and why should they?
Copyright law is an especially complex, nuanced and fact-specific
body of legal rules. A clear, rigid ex ante process such as § 512 seems
mismatched with a body of law that derives much of its value from
flexibility and nuance.
We were particularly surprised by the findings that such a large
number of notices present serious substantive questions about the
underlying claim. We expected to see some notices with substantive
flaws-the simple ex ante process and the weak remedies available
for spurious claims create an irresistible temptation for the upset or
unscrupulous. But the high number of problematic notices we found
strikes at the heart of the § 512 process and is particularly troubling.
At least in our data set, takedown has occurred in numerous
questionable situations. Moreover, a large portion of our data was
derived from notices to remove links from Google's search index-a
situation where liability is not likely to accrue to the OSP, in any case.
Flaws in these notices are particularly unlikely to be caught or
remedied, as a search engine can rarely notify creators of indexed
content that they have been de-listed. Yet removal from search
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engines is in many ways almost as significant to the target as removal
from a webhost and the Internet-without search engines, most users
have no way to find or access content. The removal of links from
search indexes can cause the information essentially to disappear, as it
is no longer easily findable. 218 Flawed removals in the search engine
context, therefore, are both unlikely to be caught or fixed, and pose a
significant threat to speech interests.
In addition, we observed other issues with the notices in our data
set. A number of notices appeared to be addressing a primarily non-
copyright concern, whether a competitor's search engine ranking,
trademark rights, or personal privacy or other issues. This is also quite
troubling, since the debates around the legislation, the compromises
made, and the policy decisions enshrined by Congress in § 512 were
limited to questions of copyright infringement. 219 Additionally,
though we cannot draw conclusions based upon the lower number of
§ 512(c) "hosted content" notices, these also contained substantive
flaws. Finally, the unexpected and unintended use of § 512(a) in an
attempt to police peer-to-peer filesharing creates separate concerns,
discussed infra.
Thus, the implications for expression on the Internet of this
extrajudicial process appear, from our limited data, significant.
Removal of speech from the Internet, with very little or no process, is
a strong remedy for allegations of infringement, especially where
there are so few recourses available to the targeted speaker. The
stakes are high. As the Supreme Court recognized in Reno v.
ACLU,220 the Internet is a major platform of speech. Its importance to
the American public has only grown in the decade since Reno was
decided. The Internet is now a primary resource for speakers seeking
to disseminate significant business, political, legal, medical, scientific,
artistic and creative data. In the realm of political information, the
Internet is perhaps the most significant platform for dissemination of
unpopular and controversial information. As such, the high incidence
218. See DEBORAH FALLOWS, SEARCH ENGINE USERS (Pew Research 2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-Searchengine users.pdf" 84% of Internet users have used
search engines; on any given day 56% of those online use search engines; when searching, 44%
stick to a single search engine; 48% stick to 2 or 3; only 7% use more than three. Id. at page 13.
The 7% of users who use more than three search engines are the most sophisticated users;
leaving 93% of users relying on three or fewer search engines. The level of trust and reliability
in a particular search engine is therefore particularly important for these users, who constitute
the vast majority of Internet searchers.
219. See supra Section IV.
220. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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of flawed notices we discovered in our review gives us pause.
Discussion of a few of the particular issues follows.
1. Confusion Regarding the Coverage and Limits of
Copyright Law and Section 512
As described supra Section VI, our data reveal confusion about
the rights conferred both by copyright law, and by the DMCA § 512
process, at least on the part of senders. 221 Although we did not expect
it, in hindsight this is not surprising: copyright law is a complex and
nuanced area of law, and the § 512 process is simple and inexpensive
for senders. Perhaps such a result is to be expected. Although sending
a notice is simple, matching the notice with the proper parameters of
the takedown does not always occur. We discussed supra the fact that
senders sometimes send notices that reveal a misunderstanding of the
subject matter and limits of copyright protection. Senders also
sometimes request or demand OSP action other than that required by
the DMCA-requesting policing,222 affirmations of removal or other
communications. It cannot be ascertained from the notices whether
this reflects senders' misunderstanding of their rights, bluster on the
part of senders or other goals. Further, the demanded removal itself
can sometimes be overbroad.223 The § 512 process is intended to
target only that content which is infringing. In practice, however,
users sometimes cite a high-level URL, or a URL that covers a broad
range of material, causing, for instance, an entire website to be taken
down or delisted, instead of solely the infringing content. 224 Likewise,
a single web page that includes a wide variety of content could be
removed, just to get at one incorporated image file, overly-lengthy
quotation, etc. 225
221. The low number of counternotices discovered, even in the face of the relatively high
number of flaws that we found, see supra Section VI, could indicate a similar confusion on the
part of notice targets, but it is impossible to know.
222. See, e.g., notice # 1934, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1934
(dated May 12, 2005) (Goldon Fishing).
223. See, e.g., notice # 433, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgiNoticelD-433
(dated Oct. 16, 2002) (Leslie Kelly / Amish requesting takedown of the entire NAMI website,
because one article on the site had one image taken from a website which took it from his book.
224. See, e.g., notice # 548 (available upon request from the author) (a Scientology
complaint about the Scientology criticism site, "Operation Clambake." In this instance, the
targets' website ultimately was put back into Google's search index).
225. See, e.g., notice # 433, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=433
(dated Oct. 16, 2002) (Leslie Kelly requesting takedown of the National Alliance on Mental
Illness (NAMI) website because of the inclusion of one photograph as an illustration on a single
web page: "I hereby demand that Cogent Communications effect an immediate takedown of
your client's website at http://nami.org until they remove my image .... ).
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2. Competitive Uses of § 512
The extent of the observed use of § 512(d) against competitors
was also unexpected and possibly troubling. On the one hand,
copyright disputes between competitors are to be expected. On the
other hand, 64 (22.5%) of competitor-related § 512(d) notices sent to
Google were substantively questionable. Of the § 512(d) notices sent
to Google we deemed competitor-related, at least 27 (9.5%)
specifically mention that they are unhappy with the page rank of the
other party.226 As such, § 512(d) appears to be used in some instances
as a new weapon in the search-rank wars, another worrisome and
unintended consequence of the process. As the Internet has become a
central marketplace, market participants have cast about for new
competitive tools. The § 512 process-simple, cheap and almost
always successful in removing the target from a search engine-was
too irresistible not to be used. Unfortunately, as with other
questionable uses, the defenses and remedies for misuse are not
sufficiently robust to forestall actual misuses.
3. Section 512(a) "Notices"
Concerns about improper takedown are thrown into relief by the
use of § 512(a) "notices." Based on our limited data-which does not
allow us to draw conclusions-we suspect that notices sent in
§ 512(a) situations often represent the music and movie industries'
attempts to reduce the untrammeled sharing of copyrighted music and
movies over peer-to-peer networks. This is further confirmed by a
confidential interview with a large-ISP representative, which revealed
that larger ISPs received tens-of-thousands of notices-largely
§ 512(a) complaints-in a year.227 The cost to ISPs of dealing with
this many notices is high, indeed. The potential cost to an accused
infringer is also high. If a sender succeeds in convincing an OSP to
respond to a § 512(a) notice as if it were a § 512(c) or (d) notice, all
the OSP can do is terminate the target's service contract. Users suffer
the harsh remedy of loss of Internet access, through an extrajudicial
process with no guaranteed remedy of return. This remedy goes far
226. As an aside, we note that many of these notices-foremost among them those from
Mir Internet Marketing-are from so-called search-engine optimizers, a relatively new industry
dedicated to helping website developers increase search engine rank and traffic to their sites. See
Brad Stone, Hotwiring Your Search Engine, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10415455/site/newsweek. If § 512 notices are becoming a front
in the search engine ranking wars, then it is perhaps unsurprising that the SEOs use these tactics,
themselves.
227. See also supra note 99.
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beyond stopping the user's alleged copyright infringement and
entirely removes her ability to obtain Interet-based information or to
communicate on any topic through an Internet-based medium through
her account, be it a message board, blog commentary or e-mail.
Further, in many markets, there are only limited numbers of
alternative providers of Internet service. 228 Unfortunately, it is not
clear that an offsetting benefit to copyright holders exists. Even if a
user's account is terminated, that user is likely only one of many
sources of the offending file. And when OSPs afford users little or no
procedural opportunity to dispute or respond to claims, senders have
no feedback mechanism to improve their own accuracy and targeting
methods.
This situation can pose significant due-process-type problems for
Internet access subscribers. Deeper analysis of the § 512(a) notices in
our data set reveals that OSPs sometimes threaten to cut off the user's
Internet access based solely on the single allegation mentioned in the
notice, requiring assurances or proof that the alleged activity has
ceased.229 Similar "infringement activity reports" have generated
other litigation on behalf of the recording industry, some of which has
been challenged on the grounds of misidentifying the infringing
party.230 Indeed, one notice in the database includes a note from the
target, complaining that they did not in fact make such a distribution;
but as the original complaint was not included, they had no way to
228. See LEE RAIN1E,. ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, RURAL AREAS
AND THE INTERNET 10 (2004), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPRural Report.pdf ("About 29% of rural users say the ISP
to which they subscribe is the only one available to them.").
229. See, e.g., notice # 188, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=188
(dated Nov. 5, 2001) ("Failure to comply with these policies may result in a permanent
termination of your service.... A reply to this e-mail is required."); notice #917
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=917 (dated Oct. 24, 2003) ("To avoid
any possible interruption in service, please notify us of your corrective actions regarding this
issue."); notice # 2200 (dated Aug. 1, 2005) (available upon request from the author)
("Accordingly, Cox will suspend your account and disable your connection to the Internet
within 24 hours of your receipt of this e-mail if the offending material is not removed.").
230. See Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Sept. 26, 2003, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20030926_unsafe harbors.php
(describing multiple misidentifications by the Recording Industry Association of America in its
subpoenas and complaints); Jordana Boag, The Battle of Piracy Versus Privacy: How the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) Is Using the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) As Its Weapon Against Internet Users' Privacy Rights, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 24
(2004) (describing some of the misfilings); and Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases:
Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 603 (2005) (explaining how DMCA enforcement companies use bots to find
potentially infringing files, and describing some of the problems that can and have ensued as a
result of mis-identification by those bots).
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protest it.231 Universities receiving such notices have initiated
disciplinary proceedings against students, including in one instance
reporting to a law student's dean allegations that the student
downloaded gay pornography. 232 We also observed some obvious
misstatements of the law in the notices from OSPs to their
subscribers. For instance, some notices represented to the targets that
the OSP was covered under the provisions of § 5 12(c). 233
Last but not least, the use of "takedown notices" in contexts
where § 512(a) would apply seems to indicate that the process is not
working for some copyright holders. Peer-to-peer and other
distributed networks were not anticipated by policymakers during the
crafting of § 512, and in a world where valuable copyright properties
are distributed without "hosting" ever occurring, the notice-and-
231. Notice # 2230 (dated July 18, 2005; unpublished but archived at Chilling Effects). On
submitting the notice to Chilling Effects, the target wrote:
IMPORTANT NOTE: There was NO attachment included with this e-mail
notice. Therefore we do not know the identity of complaintant [sic), what
material allegedly "infringes the copyrights of a complainant's members". I
replied asking for more information, at least a copy of the complaint. No
response from the ISP as of this submission, and our account has not been
disabled (yet?). I would like to know what we should do if Cox were to decide to
disable our account, since Cox has a MONOPOLY on cable interet in Nevada.
If we lost our account, my husband and I will be without Internet! We are both
(and have always been) hard-working, law abiding citizens and would NEVER
knowingly infringe on someone's copyrights. HELP!
232. Notice # 837, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca5l2/notice.cgi?NoticelD=837 (dated
Sept. 3, 2003) (notice was "forwarded to Student Judicial Affairs for further
investigation/action" and the e-mail was cc'd to the Associate Dean of the Law School).
233. See, e.g., notice # 2200 (available upon request from the author) (dated Aug. 1, 2005):
[W]e have received a notification that you are using your Cox High Speed
Internet service to post or transmit material that infringes the copyrights....
Pursuant to the provisions of the [DMCA], ... Cox is required to 'act
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to' the infringing material in order to
avoid liability for any alleged copyright infringement.
In fact, as discussed in Section II, Cox in this instance is acting as a broadband provider, and
receives a straightforward safe harbor under § 512(a). Cox is not required to "remove or disable
access" to the material; that is a requirement imposed on § 512(c) providers. Similar
misstatements have cropped up elsewhere in the database. In notice # 627 (available upon
request from the author) (dated Mar. 26, 2003) (unpublished for other reasons but on file at
Chilling Effects), the OSP sent a notice to its customer stating that, "The purpose of this letter is
to allow you to voluntarily remove the content .... If you choose not to remove the DMCA
content, Affinity is required to disable access to it .... Under the terms of the DMCA, you do
not have the right, at this point, to dispute the claims set out in the DMCA notice." The DMCA
does not specify when the counternotice could be filed. The statute does contemplate that
content will be removed on demand and not replaced until 10-14 days after the counternotice is
filed unless the original complainant files litigation. But it is by no means clear that the terms of
the statute do not permit countemotice or require that the 10-14 day clock only begin tolling
after takedown.
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takedown provisions under § 512(c) seem less likely to be of use to
the very copyright industry groups that helped compromise on the
question of OSP liability during the legislative process. Given the
costs imposed on OSPs and end users by attempts to make § 512(a)
providers fit into the § 512(c) mold, we find this result, particularly,
to indicate a need for change in the law.
4. General
Policy concerns related to questionable takedowns seem likely to
increase in importance-however successful or problematic the
process is, as the total number of notices sent over time rises,
problematic notices may receive attention. Some notices are certainly
sent in order to accomplish the paradigmatic goal of § 512-the
inexpensive takedown of clearly infringing hosted content or links to
infringing web sites. But our data also show the process commonly
being used for other purposes: to create leverage in a competitive
marketplace, to protect rights not given by copyright (or perhaps any
other law), and to stifle criticism, commentary and fair use. These
unanticipated or unintended uses of the process are having a
continuous and perhaps unquantifiable effect on public discourse.
OSPs have significant financial disincentive to attempt to distinguish
between spurious and valid copyright claims. Doing a more detailed
and costly check on notices would often simply result in an
assessment of risk of secondary liability in a "gray" situation-
exactly what OSPs hoped to avoid through legal safe harbors. In
theory, such OSP behaviors might become a consumer choice-point,
with consumers choosing OSPs more likely to resist overbroad
takedowns, but the lack of public discussion of this issue suggests that
consumers have little awareness of the issue or means to compare
OSP behavior on this issue. Moreover, search engines, specifically,
are not providers chosen by the beneficiaries of their service, and a
target generally cannot simply recapture the value of a Google-
indexed link by relying on another provider. Neither obvious legal nor
marketplace mechanisms operate to check the growth in scope and
breadth of what can be placed in a § 512 notice. The simple process
and the strong extrajudicial remedy provide a simple and expedient
process available to victims and abusers alike, encouraging
complainants to shoehorn a variety of ill-fitting claims into copyright.
The surprising number of questionable takedowns we observed,
taken in conjunction with the ex ante removal of content, the minimal
remedies for abuse of the process, and the apparent lack of use of the
counternotice procedures, suggest that few are well-served by the
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current § 512 process, and some or many individuals, as well as
public discourse and the Internet's value as an expressive platform,
may be harmed. Our dataset is, as noted, limited, so further research
to prove or disprove these concerns is necessary. Further research
might also help illuminate reforms other than those we suggest in the
next section, or help to indicate which among them would be most
effective.
B. Suggestions for Change
The troubling uses of § 512 reveal, we think, a need for reform.
In light of the significant flaws apparent in the structure of the act,
and in its performance as indicated by this study, some might
recommend wholesale repeal of § 512 in favor of a strong universal
safe harbor for OSPs. We suspect that such a repeal is unlikely. We
therefore suggest some reforms that would return some balance to the
present ex ante, extrajudicial takedown system. Moreover, while there
are significant problems with the procedure as currently defined, we
recognize that the story has not been all bad.234 For example, despite
abuses by some of their number, some individual copyright holders
and small businesses currently benefit from the ease and
inexpensiveness of the process.235 Therefore, retaining essential
benefits for complainants, while increasing protections for targets, is
our goal with these suggestions.
First, the ex ante takedown in the § 512(c) context, combined
with lack of counternotice use and other procedural defects, is the
feature of the system that strikes the greatest blow to due process and
fairness. Therefore, we suggest delaying the takedown until after an
opportunity for counternotice has been offered. The drawback to this
suggestion is that the complainant would not get the nearly-immediate
234. In fact, one commentator feels the process should be reformed in the other direction,
and that even the simple notice process currently available is too onerous a duty for small and
independent copyright-holders, who are burdened by policing their own copyrights. He
recommends requiring OSPs to police their networks, in part on keyword searches. Colin
Folawn, Neighborhood Watch: The Negation of Rights Caused by the Notice Requirement in
Copyright Enforcement Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 26 SEATTLE UNIV. L.R.
979 (2003). In light of the numerous demonstrated problems with keyword filtering, we think
such a solution would be ineffective, as well as difficult to define, and unnecessarily
burdensome on OSPs.
235. Expense is likely a key issue for small copyright holders. Mark Lemley and Tony
Reese have suggested that, at least in the P2P context, a UDRP-Iike system might effectively
and inexpensively allow resolution of copyright disputes. While acknowledging the flaws of the
UDRP, they suggest that these flaws could be addressed in developing a P2P dispute resolution
system. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving
Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005).
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resolution of a copyright infringement problem that she does now. In
light of the substantial number of notices where judicial review is
clearly necessary in our dataset, however, it seems that the shift to ex
ante takedown created myriad unintended consequences that must be
addressed. Building some due process back into the system is
necessary. The process would still be simple and inexpensive, and
could work relatively quickly.
We additionally suggest some further procedural guarantees and
protections. First, we recommend that § 512(g) be reformed to
straightforwardly require OSPs to provide notice to their subscribers
before takedown, 236 and to explicitly disallow undermining this
consumer protection through service contracts. Second, requiring
some guarantee that the target actually receive the notice would
ensure that targets are not surprised by takedowns. 237 Third, we
suggest shifting the putback provision to require OSPs to return any
content removed, on receipt of a countemotice filed at any point prior
to a judicial settlement of the issue finding against the target. We
realize that this weakens the cost-benefit of the § 512 process
considerably. After all, however, in the offline world, a cease-and-
desist letter should be backed up by a credible threat of litigation.
Presumably, the complainant could directly communicate with the
target once the OSP has connected them, and negotiations could
commence.
We further suggest strengthening the § 512(f) defense, a reform
aimed at ensuring that the notice-and-takedown process is not a
tactical tool for the search engine ranking wars, and lessening its use
for spurious or frivolous claims. 238 The § 512(f) defense requires a
236. Mark Robins points out that the countemotification procedures apply only when OSPs
receive notices, not when OSPs obtain "red flag" knowledge. Mark D. Robins, Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Defenses for Providers of Online Storage Services and Information
Location Tools, 16 No. 6/7 COMPUTER LAWYER (June/July 1999). We suggest that notice to
subscribers would be appropriate in almost all instances of red flag knowledge. An OSP may not
be well-suited to assess various defenses a user might have, including first sale, or fair use
purpose, or whether a work is substantially similar to another work. Providing notice to the user
permits the user to explain the situation if possible, and in the case of inadvertent infringements
or infringements due to misunderstandings of the law, take remedial actions themselves. An
OSP that wishes to engage in policing the material itself, without notice to the user, ought
properly to take on the legal responsibility for harm to the user in wrongful removals.
237. For instance, implementing a "return receipt requested" tag on the e-mailed notices; or
at the very least, ensuring that messages are not bounced back from erroneous e-mail addresses.
238. Lauren McBrayer recently reviewed four anti-circumvention cases in which cease-
and-desist recipients filed anti-SLAPP claims against the complainant, DirecTV. Lauren
McBrayer, The DirecT V Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-
Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603 (2005). While anti-SLAPP laws offer an interesting
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"material misrepresentation"-a high bar. Coupled with this high bar,
the ease and simplicity of the notice-and-takedown process does little
to discourage frivolous or ill-thought claims. Thus, we recommend at
least strengthening the remedies for abuses of this process. For
example, a "material misrepresentation" should entitle the victim to
punitive, as well as actual, damages and attorneys' fees.
Finally, we recommend one additional procedural protection for
targets. Section 512 should also be amended to clarify that "multiple
infringers" are those individuals adjudicated to be infringing in
multiple, separate judicial actions. Multiple allegations of
infringement ought not count, and this should be clear in the
statute. 239
Second, we feel that the scope and structure of § 512 needs
significant reform. Section 512(d) might safely be repealed entirely in
favor of a blanket safe harbor, similar to that provided to routing and
transmission OSPs under § 512(a). 240 The value of the safe harbor to
search engines and indexes is speculative at best, since a search
engine's liability for automatically indexed content is attenuated. 24 1
Clarifying any uncertainty here with a straightforward safe harbor for
search engines simply makes sense. Repealing the notice-and-
takedown process for § 512(d) providers would not diminish the
ability of copyright-holders to target OSPs with closer relationships to
providers of infringing content, such as webhosts. And for innocent
targets, repeal would solve a problem that is otherwise almost
impossible to fix. Removal from a search engine is a nearly
potential response for beleaguered notice recipients, as does the Relate v. Jones notion of
enjoining parties from filing takedown notices, we feel that these uses of judicial processes to
regulate the extrajudicial processes only further demonstrate the need to directly tackle the
underlying problem. Relate v. Jones, supra note 195.
239. Malla Pollack likewise recommended that ISPs should only be permitted to disconnect
individuals "who have been held repeat infringers by a court." Malla Pollack, Rebalancing
Section 512 to Protect Fair Users from Herds of Mice-Trampling Elephants, or A Little Due
Process Is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547,
574 (2006).
240. We are certainly not the first to suggest this more limited reform. See also Craig W.
Walker, Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions to Search Engines, 9 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1185 (2004) (arguing that it would be better to simply exempt search engines altogether
from liability, because bad statutory drafting in § 512 makes the statute difficult to parse,
targeting search engines poses threats to free expression, and copyright owners have other
means to protect their interests).
241. Section 512(d) may currently provide some benefit to ISPs by heightening the test for
secondary liability. See Yen, supra note 16; Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing
Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004).
It would be better to simply clarify that mere linking constitutes neither contributory
infringement, vicarious liability, nor "inducement" to infringe.
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irremediable harm, since those whose links are removed rarely
receive notice. Such a repeal would also satisfactorily harmonize and
ratify the growing consensus in caselaw that linking, by itself, does
not constitute direct or secondary infringement. Finally, it would
remove any temptation to send flawed notices in an attempt to
influence one's search index rank by removing a competitor.
In light of Blake A. Field v. Google, we recommend clarifying
the plain language of § 512(b) to make it clear that any automatic
caching of content subordinate to indexing processes or network
management would be covered by a straightforward safe harbor.
While the "notice-and-takedown" provision for password-protected
content seems like a good idea, it also seems unnecessary and overly
technical, and thus likely to cause confusion. We recommend further
study into whether this provision is used, and how-and perhaps a
wait-and-see approach to give courts an opportunity to adopt or reject
the Blake court's application of it. If it is consistently unused or
misapplied, then § 512(b) might safely be repealed.
Recognizing that significant file-sharing and copyright-
infringing behavior has shifted from the § 512(c) and (d) environment
to the § 512(a) environment, where the notice-and-takedown
procedures are ineffective, but widely implemented, we recommend
Congress evaluate ways to provide compensation for copyright
holders for unauthorized file-sharing. 242 We do not recommend
implementation of a notice-and-takedown process in the § 512(a)
environment. Given the evidence of overbroad use in the § 512(c) and
(d) contexts, we anticipate that similar problems will arise in the
§ 512(a) context. Such problems would perhaps be more serious in
the § 512(a) context, as "routing and transmission" services are the
means through which speakers access the essential communications
platform that is the Internet. Moreover, evidence of mistaken
targeting in the existing P2P litigation243 makes us leery of any state-
authorized restrictions on such an important function without robust
procedural protections.
242. Should Congress accept this invitation, it will have myriad recommended courses of
action to evaluate. Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow P2P File
Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-468180; WILLIAM
FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT
(Stanford Univ. Press 2004); A BETTER WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING
OF MUSIC FILE SHARING (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2004),
http://www.eff.org/share/collective-licwp.php.
243. See supra note 229.
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However, if, as we understand, vast numbers of copyright
infringement notices are sent to § 512(a) OSPs, then this provision
needs reform as well. As previously stated, we do not recommend any
notice-and-takedown provisions for the § 512(a) context. However, it
seems that at least some service providers do act on notices, whether
by building a record of multiple accusations on their users, or by
threatening their users with cut-off based on Terms of Service
violations. Consequently, in light of the serious speech and livelihood
interests at stake, we recommend that § 512(a) OSPs be required to
inform their users of any complaints against them, and that users be
offered the opportunity to submit counternotices in advance of any
action taken against them. The procedural protections we recommend
affording to § 512(c) notice targets should also be applied by any
§ 512(a) OSP that implements a notice, recordkeeping or cut-off
process-specifically, a robust notice requirement; guarantee of
receipt of notice; and reinstatement of service on receipt of
counternotice at any point unless a court finds against the target.
Additionally, section 512(f) protections against abuse should be
afforded to § 512(a) subscribers.
CONCLUSION
Other reforms than those sketched here may be in order,
particularly with respect to § 512(c). 244 However, the reforms we
244. Participants at the Santa Clara Conference made some additional suggestions. Eric
Goldman, Marquette University, raised the notion of trying to separate high commercial value
copyrights from low commercial value copyrights. This idea strives to capture the important
distinction between commercial piracy of commercially valuable copyrighted works and
personal and fair uses. This is an important distinction, and one that is certainly elided by the
process as it exists now. However, we fear that it would be difficult to define, difficult for users
to understand, and difficult for OSPs to implement of it without significant reviews of the
notices. Moreover, we see no justification for valuing the copyrights of large rightsholder
industries more than the copyrights of small and independent rights' holders whose copyrights
may be objectively less commercially valuable. We therefore do not recommend such a
distinction at this time. Likewise, Malla Pollack suggested regulating uses differentially. See
Malla Pollack, Rebalancing Section 512 to Protect Fair Users from Herds of Mice-Trampling
Elephants, or A Little Due Process Is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547 (2006). For instance, personal uses would not be subject to
the notice-and-takedown provisions while commercial uses would be. This would set up a
separate set of standards used only to evaluate online uses of copyrighted content, which would
ultimately create more confusion in the law. We therefore recommend targeting the § 512
process directly. Moreover, while protecting personal noncommercial uses would certainly
address many problems with the § 512 process, such a reform could also address many problems
endemic to copyright law more generally.
The literature on § 512 has yielded some jurisprudential recommendations over the years.
Bretan recommended that courts examine the safe harbor question prior to any question of
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propose would go some way toward re-balancing the § 512
framework to protect copyright holders, while hopefully avoiding
unduly burdening OSPs, and reinstating some critical procedural
protections for alleged infringers. We look forward to further research
into how the process is being used in hopes that that research will
further support these suggestions or suggest better alternatives.
Section 512 was developed with good intentions to solve a difficult
problem, and though our data lead us to think its critics' concerns
were well-founded, we hope that some wise adjustments will address
those concerns.
liability, since reviewing liability issues first may color the analysis of the safe harbor. Jennifer
Bretan, Harboring Doubts About the Efficacy of § 512 Immunity Under the DMCA, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 43 (2003). We note that in many instances, it would also be judicially
more efficient to review safe harbor first. Some courts seem to agree. See, e.g., Corbis v.
Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 ("Although it may seem premature to address Amazon's
DMCA defense before first determining whether Amazon has violated Corbis's copyrights...,
such an approach makes sense under the circumstances.").
* * *
